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Supreme· Court of Appeals of . Virginia 
.AT RICHl\fOND. 
Record N·o. 1442 
~HE QOMM:ONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, L. McCARTHY 
· DOWNS, .AUDITOR OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS 0~' . 
THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA., JOHN . 
M. PURCEL4 STATE TREASURER, AND 
. E. R. COMBS, COMPTROLLER, 
vs. 
: NATIONAL ~,mE INSURANCE COMPANY OF HART-
FORD. 
PETITION ON BEHALF OF THE. COMMONWEALTH 
OF :VIRGINIA, JOHN 1\L PURCELL, STATE 
TREAS.UR·ER, AND E. R. COMBS, 
COMPTROLLER. 
'l'o the Hono'l·a.ble Justices o{ti~e Supreme Court of Appeals 
of V i1·ginia: 
. Your petitioners, The Commonwealth of Virginia, John M~ 
Purcell, State Treasurer, and E. R. Combs, Comptroller, re· 
spectfully show that they are aggrieved by a decree of tho 
Circuit Court of the City of Richmond entered on the 17tll 
day of July, 1933, in a suit in equity brought against them 
by the National Fire· Insurance Company .of Hartford. 
A transcript of the record in said suit is herewith pre .. 
sent-ed. A. copy of this petition was mailed to opposing· coun-
sel in the trial court on the 9th day of September, 1933. 
Counsel for petitioners desire to state orally the reasons 
. . 
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for reviewing the decision complained of, and also to adopt 
this petition as their brief.- ' · 
I ASSIGNMENTS OF ERRQR: 
·The assignments of error are : 
.. , 
' 
) .. l 
1. '11he trial court erred in overruling the demurrer to the 
bill of complaint. 
2. The trial court erred in. holding that Chapter 414 of 
the Acts of the General Assembly of Virginia for the year 
1932 is unconstitutional, invalid and of no binding effect. 
3. The trial court erred in entering the decree requiring the 
return to the complainant insurance company of the money 
paid by it to the State Treasurer. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE: 
National Fire Insurance Company of Hartford, a corpo-
ration, not a mutual or co-operative company, engaged in the 
business of effecting insurance against risks of loss by fire 
and· lightning in certain cities, towns and counties in ;virginia 
which have regularly organized fire departments, during May, 
1933, filed its bill of complaint and exhibits in the Circuit 
Court of the City of R!chinond, Virginia, against The Com-
monwealth.of Virginia, L. ~{cCarthy Downs, Auditor of Pub:-
lic Accounts of the Commonwealth of Virginia, John M. Pur• 
cell, State Treasurer, and E. R. Combs, Comptroller, praying 
the said Court to pass upon the constitutionality of an Act of 
the General Assembly of· Virginia, approved March 31st, 1932, 
and found on pages 869-872, inclusive, of the Acts of the Gen-
eral Assembly of .Virginia .. for the year 1932, being Chapter 
414, and asking the said Court to direct the State Treasurer 
to repay to complainant the sum paid to him by complain-
ant pursuant to an assessment made under authority of said 
Act of the General Assembly of Virginia. 
On July 17th, 1933, the defendants filed a demurrer alleg-
ing the said Act of the General Assembly of Virginia to be 
in all respects a valid enactment not contrary to the provisions 
of the State or Federal Constitution. On the same day the 
trial court entered an order overruling the demurrer, hold-
ing the Act to be unconstitutional, although assigning no rea-
sons therefor, ordering a refund of the sum above mentioned, 
aud dismissing L. McCarthy Downs, Auditor of Public Ac-
counts of the Commonwealth of Virginia, one of the defend-
ants as not being a proper party to the suit. 
- -- --------- --------
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The said Act o£ the General Assembly o£ Virginia ap-
proved March 31st, 1932, in substance, provides that fifty 
(50c) cents out of every one hundred ($100.00) dollars of 
premiums received each year by non~mutual fire and lightning 
insurance companies for insurance on property within such 
cities, towns and counties of the State having fire departments 
or fire companies, shall be paid to the State Treasurer and 
from this fund appropriation n1ay be made by the General 
.Assen1bly from time to time to certain trustees appointed and 
· controlled by the State, which trustees shall expend the fund 
for the relief of injured and disabled firemen and for the re-
lief of those actually dependent upon a fireman who has lost 
his life in fire service, and for payment of necessary funeral 
expenses of any such fireman. A more detailed analysis of 
the Act follows: 
ANALYSIS OF CHAPTER 414 OF THE ACTS OF THE 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY FOR 1932. 
- Section 1 of the Act provides that each fire and lightning 
insurance con1pany, except mutual and cooperative, doing 
business in a city, town or county which has an organized 
fire department under control of a mayor, council or other 
governing body shall make an account of all premiums col-
lected for business done in each such city, town or county 
during- each calendar year~ Such return shall be made to the 
Commissioner of Insurance and Banking within sixty days 
after the 31st of December of each year. 
Section 2 of the Act provides that each such company shall, 
'vithin ninety days from the 31st day of December, in addi-
tion to such other taxes, pay to the Treasuret· of Virginia, 
fifty ( 50c) cents out of every one hundred ( $100.00) dollars 
prmniums received during the year, on fire and lightning in-
surance on property within such cities, towns and counties; · 
that such fund shall constitute a firemen's relief fund to be 
used by disabled firemen and relief of widows and dependent 
children of deceased firemen, but for no other purpose; that 
such fund shall be held by the Treasurer of Virginia who 
shall report to each sesssion of the General Assembly the 
amount in his hands as of J a1iuary 1st of the year in which 
the session is held, and that upon the General Assembly mak-
ing appropriations from time to time the said fund shall be 
paid over to the trustees for such relief, appointed for each 
such city, town and county of the State. 
· Section· 3 of the Act provides for the ministerial duti-es 
in connection with the reports made by the fire and light-
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ning insurance companies and has no bearing on the questions 
presented in this case. 
Section 4 of the Act provides for the appointment and 
control by the State of the trustees of the relief fund, re-
quiring that they give bond, make annual reports and ac-
counts, the approval of same, the removal of. trustees and 
filling vacancies. This Section provides that the joint mem-
bership, if more than one, or the me;ID.bership, if only one, 
org·anized fire department under Chapter 125 of the Code in 
any city, town or county; or the regularly paid . members of . 
a fire department in any city, town or county, shall con-
stitute a body for that purpose and shall annually during 
January, after five days' notice to all members, e~ect three 
trustees, who shall be qualified voters of such city, town or 
county and members of a fire company or fire department of 
suc4 city, town or county. 'rhe trustees shall have no power 
to act until their appointment is approved and entered of 
record by the Circuit Court of the County or the· Corporation 
Court of the City, if none, then the Circuit Court having ju·· 
risdiction. The trustees shall give one hundred ($100.00) dol-
lars bond l;>efore the Clerk of such court with surety ap-
proved by such court, payable .to the Commonwealth, condi-
tioned for the faithful and proper management and account-
ing of said fund. ·rhe Clerk of said court shall send a copy 
of such appointment to the Commissioner of Insurance· and 
Banking. The trustees shall annually, before February 1st, 
file with the Clerks of the Courts approving their appoint-
ment, a report setting out their transactions, receipts and ex-
penditures, and the trustees shall also send a copy of ·their 
annual report in duplicate, aceompanied by proper voucherF&, 
to the Commissioner of Insurance and Banking, which, if not 
approved by him, no further sums shall be appropriated and 
paid to them until such report is approved and filed by said 
Commissioner of Insurance and Banking. . The said Trustees 
shall serve without compensation but may be removed by 
the Court .which appointed them upon misfeasance or non-
feasance shown, upon written complaint ot any citizeu. afte~ 
five days' notice ; any vacancy shall be filled by such Court 
upon the nomination of the fire company or department. 
Section 5 of the Act provides that the Commissioner of 
Insurance and Banking shall have the authority and it shall 
be his duty to investigate any case in which he may have rea-
son to believe that any fraud, misrepresentation or mistake 
has been made in any of the returns provided for by the Act. 
Section 6 of the Act provides for enforcing the payment 
required of fire and lightning insurance companies in tho 
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Circuit Court of the City of Richmond by the Commissioner 
of Insurance and Banking, and further provides for cer-
tain penalties for violations. 
Section 7 of the Act provides that the funds arising from 
paym-ents required to be made by fire and lightning insur-
ance companies shall, under proper appropriation laws as 
the General Assembly of .Virginia may from time to time 
enact, be paid to the trustees for the various cities, towns and 
counties, which trustees shall disburse the same for the fol-
lowing purposes : 
l. For the relief of injured and disabled members of any 
fire department of such city, town or county. 
2. For the relief of those actua~ly depend-ent upon the serv-
ices of any .fireman who has lost life in the fire service of the 
city, town or county, an4 for the paytnent of the necesaary 
funeral expenses of anv metnber of s~ch fire department 
RESPECTS IN WHICH COMPLAINANT CLAIMS ACT 
TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
In its bill of complaint, _the complainant contends that the 
Act is unconstitutional in the following respects. 
(a) That the Act is indefinite and uncertain in its terms, 
especially with respect to the uses to be made of the fire-
men's relief fund, and the purpose for which it is to be dis-
bursed by the trustees. · 
(b) That the Act is in violation of Section 52 of the Con-
stitution of Virginia, providing in part: "No law shall em-
brace more than one object which shall be expressed in its 
title". 
(c) That the Act is in violation of Section 67 of the Con-
stitution of Virginia which prohibits the General Assembly 
from making appropriation of public funds to any charitable 
institution which is not owned or controlled by the State, with 
one exception no.t material to this case. 
(d) That the Act is in violation of Section 188 of the 
Constitution of Virginia which provides that "No other or 
greater amount of tax or revenue shall, at any time, be levied 
than may be required for the necessary expenses of the Gov-
ernment or to pay the indebtedness of the State". 
(e) That the Act is in violation of Section 185 of the Con-
stitution of .Virginia which provides in part that neither the 
credit of the State, nor of any county, city or town, shall be 
directly or indirectly, under any device or pretense whatso-
ever, granted to· or in aid of any person, association or cor-
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poration, and that the State shall not assume any indebted-
ness of any county, city or town nor lend its credit to the 
same. 
(f) That the Act is in violation of Section 63 of the Consti-
tution of Virginia which provides in part that the General 
Assembly shall not enact any local, special, or private law 
for the assessment and collection of taxes, granting from 
the Treasury of the State, or granting or authorizing to be 
granted from the Treasury of any political sub-division 
thereof, any extra compensation, to any public officer, ser-
vant, agent or contractor; granting any pension; or granting 
to any private corporation, association or individual any 
special or exclusive right or immunity. 
(g) That the Act is in violation of Section 168 of the Con-
stitution of Virginia which provides in part that all taxes, 
whether State, local or municipal, shall be uniform upon the 
same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the au-
tllority levying the tax and shall be levied and collected un-
der general law. 
(h) That the Act violates Section 1 of Article XIV of 
the Amendment to the Constitution of the United States which 
provides in part that no State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of the citi-
zens of the United States; that no State shall deprive any 
person of life, liberty or property without due process of . 
law; and that no State shall deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction t.he equal protection of the laws. 
A CASE OF FIR.ST IMPRESSION IN :VIRGINIA. 
The question here involved, the constitutionality of this 
legislation, is a case of first impression in Virginia although 
as wiH hereinafter appear in the brief, many decisions ap-
pear from other States upholding the constitutionality of 
such a la,v. At the outset, we call the attention of the Court, 
ho1vever, to a case which, upon casual inspection, appears 
somewhat similar to this although an analysis will clearly 
show it to be distinctly different because of reasons herein·· 
after set forth, to-,vit: Aetna Insurance Company vs. Joseph 
B1ttton, Co'ln'lni.~sioner, decided by Judge Grinnan of the Chan-
cery Court of the City of Richmond, and reported in 18 Va. 
I.~aw Register, p. 97. In that case an Act in some respects 
sin1ilar to the present legislation was enacted by the General 
Assembly of Virginia of 1908 creating a firemen's relief 
fund. Proceedings were brought against the Commissioner 
of Insurance alleging the Act to be unconstitutional. A de-_ 
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murrer was filed by the State. In his opinion, Judge Grin-
nan, in overruling the demurrer and holding the Act invalid, 
said: 
"The demurrer to the bill in this suit presents the question 
of the constitutionality of the Act of the General Assembly of 
Virginia, approved on Mar~h 11, 1908 (Acts 1909, Chap. 181), 
entitled 'An Act to Create a Firemen's Relief Fund and to· 
Increase the efOOiency of the Fire Departments in the Cities, 
Towns and Counties of Virginia'. 
The Act has been assailed upon a great many grounds, but 
it will be necessary to mention only two, in my view of the .. 
case. 
It appears to me very clearly to contravene the letter and 
spirit of that po-rtion of Section 67, Art. IV, of the present 
Constitution which provides 'nor shall the General Assembly 
make any like appropriation to any charitable institution, 
which is not owned or controlled by the State', which is an ex-
ception not relevant to this case. . 
It also appears to me that it is very clear that the tax im-
posed by the Act is for a private, not a public purpose,· and 
that therefore it cannot be sustained. 
I am of opinion that ·the ·Act in question is unconstitu-
tional and that the demurrer should be overruled.'' 
The Court's attention is called to two very distinct dif-
ferences between the Act here under consideration and the· 
one ruled upon by Judge Grinnan, to-wit: First, the 1908 
Act provided that the funds be paid to the fire companies 
while the present Act provides for payment to trustees upon 
appropriations by the General Assembly from time to time, 
and, second, under the present Act the trustees elected by 
the various fire departments to receive and disburse the 
funds, must give bonds before local courts of record and 
must have their respective appointments approved by those 
Courts. No such provision ooourred in the former legisla-
tion. An appeal from Judge Grinnan 's decision was refused 
by this Court. 
With all due respect to Judge Grinnan's opinion, it is diffi-
cult to ascertain how a fire department could possibly be 
considered ''a charitable institution not owned or controlled 
by the State", but even there is a difference for the reason 
that the State exercises control over the trustees under the 
present Act, first, in requiring the Court to approve the ap-
pointment, and second, by the General Assembly making ap-
propriations from time to time. That a fire department is not 
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a charitable institution would seem to appear from language 
in the recent case decided by this Court, to-wit, City .of Rich-
mond vs. Virginia Bonded lVarehou.se Corporatio·n, 138 S. Jjl. 
503, where the Court stated in part ( p. 506) : · 
· '' • • · • it was . also conceded that the organization op-
. erates as a fire. department for the extinguishment of fires 
as a go"'ernmental function.'' 
This Court has not only held that it is a function of muni-
cipal government, but is actually one of the so-called gov-
ernmental functions. 
It may a!so be stated that in the light of this Court's lan-
guag·e above quoted, it would appear that Judge Grinnan '~ 
decision that the tax imposed by the Act is for a private and 
not a public purpose is hardly tenable. In any event, it is 
apparent that this question is one of such serious hnport to 
the various fire departments as to demand consideJ·ation by 
this Court, and it is further believed by your petitioners that 
upon such consideration, no valid constitutional objection can 
be made to the legislation. 
ARGUMENT. 
We will treat the various contentions of the complainant 
in the order set forth in the bill of complaint using the same 
letters of designation as there used. 
(a) The complainant co1~tends the act is indefinite and un-
certain in its terms, especially with .respect to the uses to be 
made of the fund designated as the Firemen's Relief Fund 
and the purposes {o1· which it is to be disqursed by the trus-
tees. 
Because of the fact that an analysis of the Act· has boon 
already set forth, it will not be repeated here. Since this 
contention of the complainant is subject to the same indefi-
niteness of which it complains, it is difficult to answer in-
telligently. 
We do not understand that the complainant contends the 
Act is violative of any constitutional provision of either 
the State or Federal Constitution with respect to the un~er-· 
tainty or indefiniteness of the .Act. This being true this-
contention of complainant does no more than suggest that 
Courts, in future cases, will be required to gather the legis-
lative intent as embodied in the statute under well recognized 
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rules of construction, which tasks o~r Courts are daily re-: 
quired to perform without affecting the va~idity of such legis-
lation in any respect. The analysis of the Act hereinbefore 
made will in itself answer any objection as to its indebted-
ness and is so clearly and definitely expressed as to present 
no problem of construction, except perhaps the question as tv 
whom, and for what purpose, money may ultimately be paid 
out by the _trustees of the Firemen's Relief Fund. 
Section 2 of the Act levying the tax and requiring tLat it 
be paid into the Treasury of Virginia contains the follow-
ing unnecessary language : 
''The amounts so paid by the said companies, corporation~ 
and associations, shall constitute a fund to be designated as 
the fir-emen's relief fund, and used for disab~ed firemen, and 
for the relief of widows and dependent children of deceased 
firemen as hereinaft-er provided for, and the funds so acquired 
and -accrued shall be used for no other purpose, and shall bll 
paid over to the trustees for such relief, to be app_ointed for 
each city, town and county of the State, as hereinafter set 
out, upon appropriation to be made from time to time by the 
general assembly of Virginia, from funds accruing under the 
provisions of this act.'' 
The sole purpose of Section 7 of the Act is to direct, qualify 
and limit to whom and for what purpose the funds in the 
hands of the trustees may be expended by such trustees. 
Section 7 of the Act reads as follows : 
'' 7. The funds arising from the payment hereinbefore re-
quired to be made by such fire and lightning insurance com-
panies, corporations and associations shall, under such proper 
appropriation laws as the general assembly of Virginia may, 
from time to time enact, be paid to the trustees for the vari-
ous cities, towns and counties, who shall have full control of 
the funds d-erived from the provisions of this act, and shall 
disburse the same for the following purposes: 
First,-For tbe relief of injured and disablP.d members of 
any fire department of such cityt town or county . 
. Second.-For the relief of those actually dependent upon 
the services of any fireman who bas lost his life in the fire 
service of city, toWn. or county, and for the- payment of nec-
essary funeral expenses of any member of such fire depart-
rnent." 
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It will be noted that Section 2 suggests that the fund may 
be used for disabled firemen but does not mention injured 
fireman; that Section 2 suggests that the fund may be used 
for the relief of widows and dependent children of deceased 
firemen, whereas Section 7 does not expressly confine the 
dependence to wido.ws and children of deceased firemen but to 
those actually dependent upon the services ·of any such fire-
man and also for the necessary funeral expenses of any such 
fireman. As stated before, the conflict above pointed out 
does not impair the validity of the Act but merely presents a 
problem of court construction. It is an elementary princi-
ple of law that in construing· statutes that the intent of the 
Legislature is to be gathered from a view of the entire stat-
ute taken and compared together and to give every part of 
it its due meaning·, if possible; if however, the intention of 
the Legislature cannot thus be discovered, it is permissi-
ble to add to or subtract from the words used in the statute to 
give the statute the true effect intended by the body which 
created it. 
In Chesapeake and Ohio Rwy. Co. vs. Hewin, 148 S. E. 
794, the court said ( p. 795) : 
"In Posey vs. Cornrn.onwealth, 123 Va. 551, 96 S. E. 771, 
this court said: 'It is one of the fundamental rules of con-
struction of statutes that the intention. of the legislature is to 
be gathered from a view of the whole and every part of the 
statute talren and compared together, giving to every word 
and every part of the statute, if possible, its due effect and 
meaning, and to the words used their ordina.ry and popular 
1neaning, unless it plainly appears that they were used in 
son1e other sense. If the intention of the legislature can be 
thus discovered, it is not permissible to add to or subtract 
from the words .used in the statute.' Tyson vs. Scott, 116 Va. 
243, 81 S. }]. 57; FunkhO'l.tser vs. Spahr, 102 Va. 306, 46 S. E. 
378; Sherwood vs. Atlantic & D. R. Co., 94 Va. 291, 301, 26 
S. E. 943; Hoover vs. Sau,nders, 104 :Va. 783, 52 S. E. 657; 
Fox vs. Co1nmonwealth, 16 Grat. (57 Va.) 1; Postal Tel. Co. 
:vs. Norfolk & lV. R. Co., 88 Va. 920, 925, 14 S. E. 803." 
If in construing this Act the Court should be of opinion 
that there existed an irreconcilable conflict between the pro-
visions of Section 2 and Section 7 and that it would be neces-
sary to discard one or the other, we submit tha.t it is the uni-
versal rule of construction that that language used inciden-
tally should give way to the language used by the Legislature 
at a time when it was directly considering the objects and 
purposes concerning which there is a conflict. 
' 
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In Kelley and Jioyers vs. Bowman, 69 S. E. (W. :Va.) 456, 
the court said ( p. 458) : 
''Turning to 26 Am. & Eng. Ency. L. 619, we find it stated 
that 'the clause which is directed specially to the matter in 
preference to others mentioned in it incidentally only' shall 
prevail. And in the same volume (page 618) is this state-
ment of the law: 'It is an old and familiar rule that where 
there is in the same statute a particular enactment and also 
a g·eneral one, which in its nwst comprehensive sense would 
include what is embraced in the former, the particular enact-
ment must be taken to affect only such cases within its gen-
eral language as are not within the provisions of the particu-
lar enactment. But this rule is subordinate to the principle 
just stated, that statutes are to be so construed that, if pos-
sible, full ·effect shall be given to all parts thereof.' I quote 
note 1: 'Where one section of a statute treats specially and 
solely of a. matter, that section prevails in reference to that 
matter over other sections in which only incidental reference 
is made thereto, because the legislative mind, having been in 
the one section directed to this matter, must be presumed 
to have there expressed its intention, rather than in other 
sections where its attention 'vas turned to other things. Long 
vs. Gulp, 14 Kan. 412, citing Griffith vs. Carter, 8 Kan. 565.' I 
consider this doctrine pointedly applicable in this case, even 
if we say that the two clauses are directly in conflict." 
We sub1nit that the Act is not indefinite and uncertain ex-
eept possibly to the extent of to whom, and for what purposes, 
the trustees may expend the funds in their hands and under 
the well recognized rules of construction of statutes that 
Section 7 of the Act should be given effect and thereby remove 
any doubt as to its indefiniteness. 
(b) The co·mplainant contends that the act is in violation 
of section 52 of the ·constitu,tion of Virginia providing in part: 
"No law shall embrace 'more than one subject which shall be 
expressed in its title." 
This is a contention which is so often made when legisla-
tive enactments are attacked, and so seldom sustained that it 
has become consuetude. 
Specifically, the bill of complaint states, that the title cov-
ers ''all fire and lightning insurance companies'', yet the act 
exempts from its provisions certain mutual and cooperative 
companies. Because it is axiomatic as hereinafter shown that 
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the fact that a title is broader than the act is never a con-
stitutional objecti'on, this. need harc}ly be. considered. The 
second specific objection is so indefinitely pointed out that it 
is impossible for defendant intellig~ntly to ~swer it without 
discussing the entire act. Therefore, we have hereafter ex-
amined each and every part of the Act setting forth the por-
tion of the title by which it is covered. 
Section 52 of the Constitution of Virginia provides as fol-
lows: 
. ''No law shall embrace more than· one object which shl!!.l 
be expressed in its title; nor shall any law be revived or 
amended with reference to its title ; but the act revived or the 
section amended shall be re-enacted and published at length.'~ 
The title to the Act reads as follows : 
''An ACT to create a fund for the relief of injured and dis-
abled firemen; for the relief of the dependents of deceased fire-
. men; to provide for the appointment of trustees to administer 
said fund; to levy a tax upon the premiums collected by :;11 
fire and lightning insurance companies doing business in this 
State, for the purposes aforesaid; to provide for report.s of 
such business; to fix penalties for the violation of the require~ 
ments imposed upon the said business; and for other purposes 
in connection therewith.'' 
Analyzing briefly th~ provisions of the act, and setting op-
posite each respective provision the part of the title affecting 
it we observe: · 
ANALYSIS OF ACT 
1. Requirement of Insur-
ance companies reporting 
premiums collected in locali-
ties. 
2. Insurance companies re-
quired to pay tax to consti-
tute fund for disabled and 
widows of firemen to be paid 
over to trustees appointed. 
3. ·commissioner to tabu-
late returns and certify same. 
to certain state officers. 
QUOTATIONS FROM 
TITLE 
1. ''To provide reports ,,f 
such business.'' 
2. '' An act to create a fund 
for the relief of injured and 
disabled firemen; for the re-
lief of dependents of deceased 
firemen; to provide for the ap..; 
pointment of trustees. to ad-
minister said fund. '' 
3. ''To provide repor.ts of 
said business.'' 
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4. Provision for bonding 
and removal of trustees. 
5. Trustees to file annual 
reports a1id court clerk to cei·-
tify same to state officer 
named. 
6. State officer to correct 
return. 
7. Suit for failure of coin-
pany to 1nake payn1ent. 
8. General Ass~n1bly to .ap-
propriate money collect€d to 
trustees for purposes set 
forth. 
4. "To provide for ap-
pointment of trustees to ad-
·Ininister said funds _.-:!(: * ·~ 
and for other purposes in con-
nection t.herewi th. '' 
5.· "·To provide reports of 
said business. '' 
6. ''To provide for reports . 
of said business.'' 
7. "To fix penalties for the 
vi<>lation of the reqniren1ent.s 
ilnpvsed. '' 
~- ''To provide for the ap-
pointnlent of trustees to ad--
Ininister said fund :)(: *'*' ~ 
and for other purposes in con~ 
nection therewith. ' > 
It would appear clearly fron1 the above analysis that the 
tit~e is broad enough to coYer both specifically and gen-
erally every feature of the act, and that the act mnbraces · 
only one object, to-wit: rrhe establislnnent and operation of 
a firemen's relief fund. 
Vv e believe ti1a t an exmnination of the Virginia cases will 
prove conclusively that Section 52 of the Constitution of .Vir~: 
ginia is not violated by the Act in question as containing n1orir 
than one object or as to the tit~e. The fact is that the- act· 
nwr·ely provides f~r a firernen 's re~ief fund; a 1nethod of ob_. 
taining the n1oney to set it llp, the provisions· for its ·gen,. 
eral administration, nud the provisions for its distrihutio11. 
It is difiienlt for ul:i ·to huagine any statute passed which has-
a n1ore con1pletc ol)jc>{!t than this Act, nor a 1nore cornpre-
hensive; yet specific title. The Virginia cases on the subject 
fellow: · · 
In the case of" l11.tJles vs. Straus, 91 Va. 209, a leading Vir, 
ginia case frequently quote in the Virginia ':cases hereinafto~~ 
cited, an act was considered entitled, ., 'An act to authorizQ 
and p1•ovide for a speeial Qlcction in the Co.unty of Pulaski 
as to the renwval of the court-house of said countv '·'. Th€ act· 
provided for the judg_e fo call an election ··upon petition af one 
hundred or n1ore· qualified Yot.ers, to .. order }1. special election 
c.'lt a time designated ·by him .for the pttrpose of taking the 
sense of the voters as to which of three places should have 
the county court-house; ptovided for the n1anner of conduct~ 
ing the election·; notice to be g·iven; the printing of hnllotH:: 
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and removal of the court-house if sixty per cent of the votes 
were cast in favor of any one of the three places. It further 
provided the court-house shottld remain where it was unless 
such votes were cast for either of the other two places. It was 
contended that the act violated Section 52 of the Constitu-
tion. This court held that it did not, saying, at page 216: 
''The general rule governing in ascertaining the constitu-
tionality of an act of this character may be stated thus: If 
the subjects embraced by the statute, but not specified in the 
title, have 'congruity or natural connection. with the subject 
stated in the title, or are cognate or germane thereto, th~ 
requirement of the constitution as to the tit!e is satisfied. 
23 Amer. & Eng. Ec. of Law, pp. 238-9; Johnson vs. Harrison, 
47 Minn. 575, 578. Judge 'Mitchell, in delivering the opinion 
of the court in the case last cited, says: 'Any construction of 
this provision of the constitution that would interfere witl1 
the very con1mendable·policy of incorporating the entire body 
of statutory law upon one general subject in a single act, in-
stead of dividing it into a number of separate acts, would 
not only be contrary to its spirit, but a1so seriously embar-
rassing to honest legislation. All that is required is that 
the act should not include legislation so incongruous that it 
could not, by fair intendment, be considered germane to one 
general subject. The subject may be as comprehensive as 
the legis~a.ture chooses to make it, provided it constitutes, 
in the constitutional se:ftse, a single subject, and not several. 
* • • The generality of the title of an act is no objection, 
provided only it is sufficient to give notice of the general sub-
ject of the proposal legislation and of the interests like~y to 
be affected.' 8ee also Powell vs. 8'ltperv.isors of Bn.tnsu;ick 
Co., 88 Va. 707; Lescallett vs. Common~oealth, 89 Va. 878; 
State vs. Union, 4 Broon1 (N. J.) 350; People vs. Briggs, 50 
N. Y. 553; Johnson vs. Iiarrison, 47 1Iinn. 575; Falconer vs. 
Rob·inson, 46 Ala 340, 347; Carter & Co. vs. Sinton:, 120 U. S. 
523; lUontolair vs. Rarnsdell, 107 U. S. 165; Ackley School Dist. 
vs. Hall, 113 U. S. 142; Unity vs. Btt'rrage, 103 U. S. 457-
59, and Co1nmonwealth vs. B·rown, post. 
"The fact that the act authorizes many things of a di-
verse nature to be clone will not affect the sufficiency of t.hn 
title, provided tl1e doing of such things may be fairly re-
garded as in furtherance of the general subject of the enact-
ntent. 23 Amer. & Eng. Enc. of Law 239; McGurn vs. Board 
of Education, 133 Ill. 122; Blake vs. Peop!e, 109 Ill. 504; 
Lan1ed vs. Tienzan, 110 IlL 173; Mix vs. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 116 
Ill. 502; People vs. H a.zlewood, 116 Ill. 319.'' 
~ -------- -~-- ---~ 
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In Ive1·son Brown's Case, 91 Va. 762, also a leading case 
frequently cited in subsequent Virginia cases, an act of the 
G-eneral Assentbly entitled, ''An act to am-end and re-enact 
certain sections of the Code in relation to oysters and to add 
independent sections thereto, ''was in issue''. The act con-
tained a provision requiring each tongman to ·report to the 
inspector each week a true and accurate r-eturn of the amount 
of sales made by him, requiring hin1 to collect a tax on the 
sales so reported, and made it a misdemeanor for failure to 
make the report. The defendant was indicted for violation 
of the statute and contended among other things that the 
statute violated Section 52 of the Constitution. This Court 
held that it did not, saying·, at page 772: 
''It is very plain that the subjects of the various sections of 
the act under consideration are not dissimilar or discordant, 
but have natural connection with each other, and relate to 
the general subject (oysters) expressed in the title. They -
are all the means to an end. They are instrumentalities or 
the accomplishment of the g-eneral ~object of the act. No one 
interested in the subject-matter of the statute could be mis-
led by the title, or be put off his guard by hearing it read by 
the title. "Cnder the just and fair intrepretation that has 
been uniformly g·iven to the provision of Section 15, Article 
V of the Constitution, the title to the act in question is suffi-
cient, and it was unnecessary to set forth in it the various sub-
jects of its different sections, which would have, indeed; 
made the title, what the constitutional provision never in-
tended to require, an abstract of the law or an index of its 
contents.'' 
In Prison Assn. vs. Ashby, 93 Va. 667, the title of the act 
was, "An act in relation to commitment of minors to Prison 
Association of Virginia and their custody". It contained four 
sections: (1) that no person shall be committed after reach-
ing twenty-one years of age; (2) circumstances upon which 
person may be committed, and how and at whose expense they 
shall be conveyed to the association; (3) that jurisdiction of 
habeas corpus and other proceedings shall be' brought in the 
Circuit Court of Richmond; and ( 4) repealing inconsistent 
acts. The Court held the act to be constitutional under Sec-
tion 52. 
In Bosang vs. Building Association, 96 Va. 119, objection 
was made to the act as e1nbracing mor~ than one object~ 
The act in question provided a ne'v charter for a loan asso-
ciation and likewise confirmed transactions between the com--
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panies and its members theretofore existing.. The Court held 
that the act did not embrace n1ore than one object. 
In Trehy 'vs. llfarye, 100 Va. 40, the act was entitled, "An 
act to amend and re-enact an act to regulate the salary of 
the police justice of the City of Norfolk, approved Febru~ 
ary, 1896". Under the act the salary was fixed at not be-
yond the revenue paid into the Treasury by the justice. The 
justice was required to give a bond to perl'orn1 duties re--
quired by law and to keep a faithful record of cases to report 
same to the State Auditor and repeal the act requiring the 
deputies to n1ake returns to the local courts or receiving com-
pensation for transn1itting his report to the State Auditor and 
a!l fines to he paid to the City was repealed. Writ of man-
damus was brought against the Auditor of Public .Accounts in 
refusing to issue his 'varrant to the elerk of the Corporation 
Court of Norfolk for fees due hi1n for entering· the amounts 
in a suitab!e book. It 'vas contended that the statute violated 
Section 52 of t.h~ Constitution. The court held that it did not. 
In lVh-itlock vs. Hawki1ts, 105 Va. 242, an act was passed 
by the Legislature which not only validated assessnwnts 1nade 
under a previous act of the General Asse1nbly, but likewise 
provided for the mode of assessment. It was urged that the 
Constitution had been violated under Section 52 as to embrac-
ing more than one object. The Court held t~at it had not. 
In Com'l-rWn/wealth vs. lVillcox, 111 .Va. 849, an act of the 
General Assembly amended the Code section relating to gen-
~ral and special elections; when and where to be held; regu-
lations for their conduct and government; and comp~~nsation 
for services in elections. The act contained three sub-divis-
ions; (1) providing that no persons shall vote in a legalized 
pritnary election unless he is registered and qualified to vote 
at the next succeeding election; (2) pennitting· the political 
party for whom such election is to be held to prescribe the. 
plan; and (3) n1aking the laws 'vith regard to regularity and 
purity of genera1 elections applicable to the primary elections. 
It was contended that this violated Section 52 of the Con-· 
stitution quoted above. The court held that it. did not. 
In Com:nw1no.ealth vs. Chesapeake and Ohio Rwy. Co., 
118 ·va. Va. 261, an act was passed with the title, "An act 
to an1end and re-enact an act entitled an act in relation to 
the assessment, for local taxation, of the rolling stocT\: of rail-
road corporations, approved 1\Iarch 12, 1912 ". Apparent!y, 
the purpos~ of the an1endnwnt was to define the situs of 
the rolling stock for taxation and it was contended that tlw 
fitle was void under Section 52 of the Constitution. ':Phe 
court held that it 'vas not. 
------- ---- ---
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. In Richmond vs. Pace, 127 Va. 247, the act was entitle," An 
act to raise .revenue for the support of the governn.m1t and 
public free schools, to pay the interest on the public debt, 
and provide a special tax for pensions, and so forth". lt 
.was contended that the sub-section of the act violated Sec-
tion 52 of the Constitution, said sub-section providing- that 
on real estate, personal property, puh~ic service corpora-
tions or other· taxes received by the State, but hereafter to 
be collected for local purposes, the treasurers of the cQuu-
ties, cities and towns to be paid by such counties, cities and 
towns the same commissions as now allowed by law for the 
... collection of the State revenue. The court held that the act 
did not offend the Constitution. . 
In Bow•man· vs. Va. State Entomogolgist, 128 Va .. 351, the 
title to the statute was ''An act providing for the CQntrol and 
eradication of the plant disease, commonly known as 'orange' 
or 'cedar rust', in the n1agisterial districts and counties· of 
this State where said disease is prevalent". The act made · 
it unlawful to keep any red cedar tree within a radius of one 
mile of an apple orchard. It placed upon the State Entomo-
logist the duty of investigation under. circumstances described. 
It provided an appea~ fro1n the order of the State Ento-
PlOlogist; it permitted the court to fix damages for the taking· 
of the trees; it likewise provided that the law did not be.:. 
come. effective until approved by the localities. It was con-
tended that the statute offend(?d Section 52 of the State Con-
stitution quoted above. The court helQ it did not. .. 
And see Tobacco Grow.ers' Cooperative .Assn. vs. Danvill~ 
.Warehouse Co., 144 V a. 456, 132 S. E. 482'; and Macke vs~ 
Com,'lnonwealth, 159 S. E. (Va.) 148. -
It is, therefore, submitted that, as stated in Ive1·son Brown's 
Case, supra, the title need not be ''an abstract of the law or 
an index of its contents'' but, as stated in Ingles vs. Stra·u.s, 
-supra, should merely ''give noti~e of the general subject of 
.the proposed legislation and of the interests likely to be af-
fected''. The title to the Act in question is aln1ost so broad 
~s to be an index to its contents, although not required to be 
so, ancl the title clear~y gave notice of the general-subject and 
surety to the allegedly offended fire insurance cmnpanieR . 
. Clearly the present act as reiterated by our Court contain., 
su'Qjects congruous, with a natural connection with, and ger;.. 
inane to the subject expressed in the title. 
. Because of the fact that" the la,v, as laid down by our Court, 
~eems clear, no attmnpt has been made to exa1nine the law in 
otl1er States, but 've desire to call the attention of the Court. 
to one case very sin1ilar to the case at bar, Fire'men'~ Benevo-
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lent Association vs. Lmf,nsb~£ry, 21 Ill. 511. . In that case, an 
act was entitled'' An act to incorporate the Firemen's Benevo-
lent Association, and for other purposes''. Among· other 
thing·s Section 6 of the Act provided for payment to the treas-
urer of the association of a certain amount by those effecting 
insurance in Chicago. The Court held the act valid, saying 
at page 515: 
"We think the sixth section germane to the objects of the 
bill and embraced properly in the same subject, the whole of 
which, is sufficiently expressed in the title." 
It is, therefore, submitted that the Act does not violate 
Section 52 of the Constitution of Virginia. 
(c) The complatinant contends that the act is in violation 
of Section 67 of the Constitution of Virginia which prohibits 
the General Assembly from making appropriations of public 
funds t.o any charitable instit'l~tion, .. c; 'which are not owned o·r 
controlled by the State with one exception not 'material to 
this case. I 
Section 67 of the Constitution of Virginia provides as fol-
lows: 
''General assembly shall not mal{e any appropriation of 
public funds, or personal property, or of any real estate, to 
any church, or s~ctarian society, association, or institution of 
any kind whatever, which is entirely or partly, directly or 
indirectly, controlled by any church or sectarian society; nor 
shall the general assembly make any like appropriation to 
any charitable institution which is not owned or controlled 
by the State; except that it may, in its discretion, make ap-
propriations to non-sectarian institutions for the reform of 
youthful criminals; but nothing herein contained shall pro-
hibit the general assembly from authorizing counties, cities, 
or towns to make such appropriations to any charitable in-
stitution or association.'' 
It is apparently contended that the act here is void as be-
ing an "appropriation to a charitable institution which is 
not owned or controlled by the State". It is submitted, first, 
that ther.e is in the act no a.pfJropria.tion. · In fact, that is ex-
pressly left by the act to future sessions of the General As-
sembly. Herein it differed from the 1908 Act declared, in 
the opinion of Judge Grinnan in Aetna lns'ltrance CompOAty 
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vs. Button, supra, to be unconstitutional. That act actually 
appropriated the revenue to .be collected. That distinction 
in itself should dispose of this matter. However, there are 
two other ways in which the act in question must also. offend 
the constitution, even assuming, which we deny, that there is 
an ''appropriation''. They are: 
1. Are :fire departments "charitable institutions"? 
2. Assuming they are, are they ''owned or controlled by 
the State'' f 
As to the first, it would seem that the purpose of the con-
stitutional provision was well stated by Mr. Dunaway, in the 
discussion of this provision, in the Debates of Constitutional 
Convention 1901-02, page 799: 
''Taxation with representation means not only that the 
taxes shall be expended by the representatives of the people 
but that the representatives of the people may follow those 
appropriations, see to the method of their expenditure, and 
have accounts brought back from these institutions to the 
Legislature of the State, as is annually done. Take the Deaf, 
Dumb and Blind Institution, for instance, at Staunton. Money 
raised by the taxpayers is spent upon that institution, and 
rightfully expended. You can follow that money. You can ' 
prescribe the method of its expenditure. You can hold those 
who manage the appropriation to a strict accountability, and 
you can know how every cent of that money is expended. With 
regard to private institutions the case is very' different.'' 
Measured, by the eogent reasoning quoted above, it is ob-
vious that when a future General Assembly· actually makes 
an appropriation, such safeguards on the actual handling of 
the money may be enacted as will meet the reason for which 
the provision was enacted. 
In further deference, however, to the opinion of Judge 
Grinnan, it should be stated that such legislation during the 
last quarter of a century has come to be considered as com-
pensation for serviees rendered. 
Thus, in CuUin,q, City Treas., vs. Taylor, Sta.te Audito·r, 
51 N. W. (S.D.) 949. a statute of the State of South Dakota 
requiring insurance companies to pay into the State treasury 
as taxes two and one-half per cent of the gross amount of 
the premiums received in the territory during the preceding 
year was attacked as unconstitutional and the court said ( p. 
16): 
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"It is an appropriation to a proper governmental and pull-
lie. purpose, and is received by the fire companies not as a 
d«;>nation or gift, but as _fairly and fully earned and justly 
pai~. . The appropriation is not m·ade from motives of charity 
put as a matter of busi:p.ess policy and for which the fire com-· 
panies render· an equivalent, whic~ the Sta.te; as it has power; 
to do, has undertaken in advance, to accept as a full con-
sideration thereof .• ' ' · 
.. The Constitution of the State of Texas contains provisions 
similar to those of our Virginia Constitution which are raised 
in.this case. Byrd vs. Dallas, 6 S. W. (2nd) 73R These pro-
visions prevent extra compensation to any officer, agent; serv.--: 
ant or public contractor after public service performed; pre-
vent the grant of public. money to any individual, association 
of individuals, municipal or other corporations; prevent the 
State from lending its credit or g·ranting public money to· any 
individual, association or corporation; prevent .any extra-com-
pensation, fee or allowance to a public officer, agent, servant 
or contractor after service has been rendered; provide that 
taxes shall be levied and collected by general laws .and for 
public purposes only; prohibit appropriations for private or 
individual purposes; and prevent tl1e enactment of ex post 
facto laws, retroactive laws or laws impairing the obligation 
of contracts. The statute in question in this case authorized 
th~ payment of pensions by certain incorporated cities ~o 
members of the fire department, police department or fire 
alarm operators department. The pension fund was to .b(;~ 
created -by deducting one. per cent of the employee's wages 
each n1onth to be increased by donations, rewards and from 
public funds upon the majority vote of the voters of such 
city or town. The court said : 
"Without discussing in detail these provisions of the con-
t;titution, it. is suf.ficient to say each of them is intended to 
.pr~vent the application of public funds to private purposes 
• "" • . If the pension provided for in .this act is a. gratuity 
pr donation to the beneficiary, it is clearly forbidden by the 
fundamental law. On the other hand, if it is a. part of the 
compensation of such employee for services rendered to the 
city, or if it be for a pU!blic purpose, then clearly it is a valid 
exercise of the legislative power .. "' Jj$ * The right to partici-:-
pate in such fund is, therefore, not a. gratuity or donation 
in any sense. It is as much a part of the agreed compensa-
~ion as is the 1nouthly stipend. See State vs .. Love, 89 Nebr. 
149, lill N. 'V. 196; Co1nnwnwealth vs. TV alton (Pa.), 38 A. 
Commonwealth, etc~, v. Nat. Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford. 21· 
790, 61-Am. St. Rep. 713; Whitehead vs. Davie, 189 Cal. 715, 
209 P. 1008; Jackson vs. Otis, 66 Cal. App. 357, 225 P. 890; 
Ode·a vs. Cook, 176 Cal. 659, 169 P. 366; People ex rel. vs. Ab-
bott, 274 ill. 320, 113 N. E. 696; Cobbs vs. Hotne Ins. Co., 18 
Ala. App. 206, 91 S'ou. 627." 
In the ease of Trustees of Exempt Firemen's Fund vs. 
Room.e, 93 N.Y. 313, a statute requiring the agents of insur-
ers doing business in the City of New York, but not incor-
porated under the laws of New York, to pay a percentage 
upon the gross premiums received by them for insurance 
for property in that city, to the exempt firemen's benevolent 
fund, was attacked as unconstitutional, as granting exclu-
sive privilege or as giving money of the State to a private· 
undertaking, or as a tax. The statute provided that two per· 
cent of the gross premiums received by agents of foreign cor-
porations in any city or incorporated· village shou.ld be paid 
to the treasurer of the fire department o~ such city or vii..: 
1-age; if there was no such officer then the treasurer of such 
city or village was to .be deemed such officer and the pay-
ment made. to him; but in the city and county of New York 
the payment was to be made to the existing corporation rep.; 
resenting the firemen of that eity for its use and profit. The 
court said : · 
u The statute 1oas clearly a public and not a private act, 01nd 
general instead of local. It ai·med to accomplish a public pur-
pose; it was dictated by considerations of public policy; it ap-
plied to every fire department in the whole State. It seems: 
to us equally plain that the tax thus made payable was in on 
just sense qr respect, a gift of the public money, or a charity 
Oll the part of the State. It wa.s an appropriation of the tax 
to a proper governmental and public purpose, amd wa-s re-
ceived not ·on the ~q,·ound of poverty or (J)S alms, but as fairly 
and fully earned and jnstly paid. • * * The appropriation 
'vas to the fire departments. Wha.t use they would make of 
it-to what purpose apply .it-was left to. them to determine 
where they had not already determined. ~ * • 
· When the State takes from the public treasury a. sum of 
1noney and gives it to a corporate body for the relief of de-
serving beneficiaries, it does one of two things. It either he-
stows a -charity, or recognizes and discharges an obligatio11 
due· f;rom it to the recipients. The ·former it cannot do ex-
cept in specified cases. The latter it may ahvays do for the 
constitutional provision wa.s not intended and should not be 
construed to n1ake in1possible the performance of an hou-
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orable obligation founded upon a public service, invited by· 
the State, adopted as its agency for doing its work, and in-
duced by exemptions and rewards which good faith and ·jus-
tice require should last so long as the occasion demands.'' 
(Italics ours.) 
The court held that the act was not unconstitutional. 
As to whether the trustees for fire departments may be 
said to be an ''institution'' may be questioned. In ... Hassett 
vs. Carroll, 81 Atl. (Conn.) 1013, a statute forbidding an in-
terest in contracts by a. trustee of an ''institution'' receiving 
aid from the .State was held to not include a member of a 
school district committee. 
But assuming that there is an appropriation, and that it 
was made to a charitable institution, the question still re-
mains as to whether· the ''institution'' is ''owned or controlled 
by the State''. . 
It is submitted that by observation of the analysis of the 
act, supra, since only those companies doing business in a 
city or town or county with an· organized fire department un-
der the control of the mayor, council or other governing body, 
are taxed, the state through its local subdivision has control. 
Taxes are levied only on business done in such city, town or 
county. The tax is to be paid to the State Treasurer and to 
be held by him, and to report to the General Assembly in 
January. Trustees elected and approved by the respective 
local courts are required to give· bond, make annual reports 
and accounts to the State Commissioner of Insurance. Un-
less accounts are approved by him, no further sums can be 
appropriated. As if this were not enough, the act further 
provides for payment to trustees ''under such proper ap-
propriations, as the General Assembly of Virginia, may frorn. 
time to time enact''. 
While there are no decisions of this Court on this ques-
tion, in California where there is a similar constitutional pro-
vision, the Court has passed on ths question. Thus, in Board 
of Directors vs. Nye, 97 Pac. ('Cal.) 208, the constitution for-
bade an appropriation for the ibenefit of any institution not 
under the exclusive management and control of the State. 
An appropriation to a private corporation whose board of 
directors were appointed by the governor and who. were re-
quired to report to him annually their expenditures, was held 
valid. 
In Stephens vs. Chambe'l·s, 168 Pac. (·Cal.) 595, an appro..: 
priation to defray expenses of the. 'Ticksburg memorial re-· 
union was held not to be an appropriation ''for the purpose 
or benefit of ~ny corporation, association '"' e • or any other 
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institution not under exclusive eontrol and management of the 
S'tate as a State· institution"'. · 
In Firemen's B enev. Assn. vs.- Lounsbu,ry, 21 Ill. 511, the 
act in question provided that here should be "paid to the 
treasurer of said association· (the Firemen's Benevolent As-
sociation) for the use and benefit of said association,- by every 
person who shall act in the c.ity of Chicago as agent .for or 
on behalf of any individual or association of individuals, not 
incorporated by the laws of this State, to effect insurance 
against loss or. injury by fire in the city of Chicago!. although 
such individuals or association may be incorporated for that 
purpose by another state or country, the sum·:of two dollars· 
upon the hundred dollars and at that rate upon the amount 
of all premiums * _.. «c ' ' in the City of Chicago. The court· 
said: 
''A charge of a percentage upon the gross receipts by the 
agents of underwriters, we had, in Thurber's case, decided 
to be a legitimate source of revenue. The legislature·, in its 
wisdom, and in the exercise of its discretion, thoug·ht proper 
t,o divert this fund to the direct endowment of this charity, 
which was instituted for those who should be disabled while 
in a service, the general effect of 'vhich is for the direct benefit 
of underwriters, and to what source, therefore, could they 
more properly look than to those in whose service the·· ob-
jects of this charity would receive the injuries entitling them 
to the benefits of the charity Y It is in fact a burden, not 
upon the agent personally, nor yet upon the underwriter, but 
upon the assured, for the premium will always be graduated 
in view of every risk and every expense incurred by the 
assurer; as well as the encouragement afforded to the fire de-
partment and its efficiency. 
With the view we take of this case, it is immaterial whether 
this be considered a public or a private charity. But it should 
more properly be considered a public charity. As such, the 
legislature had a rig·ht. to consider it, as much as the insti-
tution for the blind. It might hav:e conferred upon it the 
right to take and condemn private property for a site for 
the building, as well as to confer upon a railroad company 
the right to take private property for a roadway.'' 
It is, therefore, submitted that the legislation in ques-
tion is not unconstitutional under Section 67, first because 
there is no "appropriation", second, because a municipal or 
county fire department is not a ''charitable institution'', and, 
third, rbecause such a department is ''controlled by the 
State". 
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(d) The complalina1d conte'llds that th'e act is in violatio'l~· 
of Section 188 of the Oonstittttion of Virginia which provides 
that "no other or greater amount of taa; or revenue shall,. at 
amy time, be l.evied tha;n ·may be required far the necessar:lf 
expenses of the Go11ernment1 or to pay the indebted'ijess of 
the ·state_,, 
Section 188 of· the Constitution ·Of Virginia reads as· fol-
lows: 
''No other or greater· ·amount of tax or revenue shall, at 
any time, be levied than may be required for the necessary 
expenses of the gov~rnment, or to pay ~he indebtedness of' 
the State." 
There appears to be only one case considered by this Court 
construing ·the above section of the constitution, and ·that is 
Shenandoah Lime Co. vs. Governor, 115 Va. 865. This ease 
concerned the constitutionality of the act known as ''Convict 
Lime Grinding Act''. The act directed that convicts be put· 
to .work grinding oyster shells and limestone .rock, and pro-
vided the material upon which they were to work and the in-
strumentalities with whi~h to do it. It further provided for: 
the sale of the product of the labor of 'the convicts and for 
~heir support ·and keep from the proceeds. .As stated by the; 
court, it was contended that ''the act is obnoxious to Article 
188 of the Constitution because it appropriates public funds 
for a private purpose .or .business". The court held that it 
did not, stating (p. 874):. 
. ''We are further of opinion that the act does not violate 
article 188 of the Virginia constitution. It does not, as con-
tended, appropriate public funds for a private purpose; no-r 
does it amount to the taking· of the property of complainants 
without due process of law, contrary to the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Federal,Constitution. It being the pur-
pose of the act to furnish employment to convicts, as appears 
from the act itself, _and that purpose being, as already seen, 
a valid exercise by the State of its police power, the appro-
priation which the act carries is clearly for a public purpose 
and. not for a private purpose. The manner in which the 
~tate shall discharge the duty of providing for its convicts 
must be vested in the discretion of the legislature. In the 
exercise of this discretion, the legislature can provide em-
ployment, and there is no constitutional inhibition upon its 
convicts being put to grinding oyster shells and limestone 
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rock, as provided in the present act, if such a course is deemed 
expedient. · An act having this object has a public or 
governmental purpose, and the incidental provision for the 
sale of the product resulting from such employment of i~s 
convicts does not affect such governmental purpose. The 
necessary consequence of the public or governmental purpose 
of such an act is the appropriation of public funds to carry 
the act into effect, and such an appropriation is not uncotl-
stitutional." 
Paraphrasing the above language, it would appear that 
the question here at issue is, first, whe.ther the act is in fur-
therance of a public purpose and not a private purpose; and, 
secondly, whether the manner in which the State disch~rges 
the duty of providing for disa.bled firemen is a question which 
must be vested in the discretion of the Legislature. 
It would, therefore, appear that in the light of the aboyc 
decision of this court, the only question to be considered is 
.whether the appropriation was for a "public. purpose". If 
it was, the' manner in which the State discharges this ''public 
purpose'' is a 1natter of legislative discretion. 
That the counties, cities and towns are merely territorial 
divisions of the State for the administration of public affairs 
js clear. 
In B·urch vs. llardwicke, 71 Va. 24, the court said (p. 32): 
"It must be borne in mind that cities and towns are mere 
.territorial divisions of the S'tate, endowed with corporate 
powers to a.id in the administration of public affairs. They 
are instrumentalities of the government acting under dele-
gated powers, subject to the control of the Legislature, ex-
cept so far as may be otherwise expressly provided by the 
Constitution.'' 
And further the court said ( p. 34) : 
''On the other hand, there are many officer~ such as city 
judge, sergeant, clerk, ·Com1nonwealth's attorney, treasurer, 
sheriff, high constable and the like, some of whom are recog-
nized by the Constitution while others are not. All these are 
generally mentioned as city officers and they are even desig-
nated so .in the Constitution; but no one has ever contended 
that either of them is in any manner subject to the control 
and removal of the mayor. The reason is, that while they 
are elected or appointed by the city, and 'vhile their juris-
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diction is confined to the local limits, their duties and func• 
tions, in a measure, concern the whole State. 'rhey are State 
agencies or instrumentalities operating to some extent 
through the medium of city charters in the preservation of 
the public peace and good governn1ent. However elected or . 
appointed, however paid, they are as much State officers a~ 
constables, justices of the peace and Commonwealth's attor-
neys, whose jurisdiction is confined to particular counties. 
* * * 
When the mob rages in the streets, when the incendiary 
and assassin are at work, they do not offend against the city, 
ibut against the· State. * ~ * 
(P. 38.) 
The distinction recognized * * * is between the officers 
whose duties ar·e exclusively of a local nature and of.ficerB 
appointed for a particular locality, but yet whose duties arc 
of a public or general nature, when they are of the latter 
character they are State officers, whether the Legislature it-
self makes the appointment or delegates its authority. to the 
municipalities. The state,· a.s a political society, is inter-
ested in the suppression of crime and in the preservation 
of peace and good order, and in protecting the rights of per-
sons and property. No duty is more general and all pervad-
ing than this. '' 
: ·Municipal corporations are creatures of the State which 
may grant or withhold powers and may modify or withdraw 
them. Richmond, etc., R. Co. vs. Rich1nond, 145 Va. 225; 133 
S. E. 800; where the Court says, ref.erring to municipal cor-
porations: 
"They are mere political sub-divisions of the State cre-
ated for the convenient administration of such governmental 
powers as n1ay be entrusted to them. They are creatures of 
the rState, which may grant or withhold such powers as to it 
shall seem meet. The State may grant these powers in whole 
or in part, conditionally or unconditionally, and may, at its 
pleasure, modify or withdraw them, with or without the con-
sent of the citizens, or even against their protests.'' 
And the Court proceeded to hold that the power of the 
Legislature to determine at whose expense an in1provement at 
an existing crossing shall be made could not be doubted, and 
this, despite the fact that the crossing was within the limits 
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of the boundaries of the City of Richmond, and the city was, 
of course, required to keep its streets in a safe condition. 
In the ease of Kirkpatrick vs. Board of S~tperviso·rs, 146 
Va. 113, the Court said with refere~ce to counties (p. 127): 
''It has been held by authorities that a county is a political 
sub-division of the State for the purpose of civil administra-
tion of such powers as may :be delegated by the State. 
This in City of Santa_Monica vs. Los Angeles County, 115 
Pac. (Cal.) 945, the Supreme Court of ·California held that~ 
'A municpal corporation is but a branch of the State gov-
ernment and is established for the purpose of aiding the Leg-
islature in making provision for the wants and welfare of the 
public within the territory for which it is organized, and it 
is for the Legislature to determine the extent to which it will 
confer upon such corporation any power to aid it in the dis-
charge of the· obligation which the Constitution has imposed 
upon itself. • $ * This is true as to counties and their govern-
ment." 
Therefore, it is clear that since counties, cities and towns 
are merely branches of the government of the State, ail ap-
propriation to them or to their officials is for a public pur-
pose. Indeed, so important are members of the local fire 
departments that they have been specifically recognized in 
the organic law of this State. 
Thus, Section 120 of the Constitution of Virginia provides 
in part that "the mayor shall see that the duties of the vari-:-
ous city officers, members of the police and fire departments 
are • * • faithfully performed"· 
It is, therefore, apparent that members of the police and 
fire departments are State and not city of:(icers. See Sherry 
vs. Lumpkin, 127 Va. 116. 
That such leg·islation is recognized as in the furtherance 
of a public purpose and entirely constitutional is clear from 
many decisions. . 
As said in State of Nebraska ex rel Metropolitan Utilities 
District vs. City of Omaha, 112 Nebr. 694: 
"This class of functions (including maintaining and op-
erating a fire department) are not franchises or privileges to 
be exercised or ignored by the munic~pality at discretion, 
but rather legal duties imposed by the· State upon its creature, 
which it may not omit with impunity but must perform at 
its peril. * * * · 
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The most common method of extinguishing fires is by 
pouring water upon the flames,. and that is one of the pub lie 
duties of the city to prevent conflagration." 
. . ' 
In the case of State of Nebraska ex rel John Haberla;n vs. 
Love, 131 N. W. (Nebr.) 196, an act requiring cities of the 
first class, having paid fire departments, to pension all fire-
men within certain limitations, was attacked as unconstitu-
tional. The court said : · · 
"Among other things Section 7, Article IX of the consti-
tution declares : 'Legislatures shall not impose taxes upon 
municipal corporations, or the "inhabitants or property there-
of, for corporate purposes.' 
'"' "" • In Gillespie vs. Lincoln, 36 Nebr. 34, 52 N. W. 811, 
16 L. R. A. 349', in an exhaustive and well-reasoned opinion 
by .. T udge Post, this court held that firemen should be placed 
in the sam·e classification as policemen and health officers ; 
that they are public or .State officers, vested with such pow-
ers as the statute confers; and that the duties th~y perform 
do not relate to the corporate functions of the municiP.ality! 
This opinion is sustained by the overwhelming weight of au-
thority~ 2 Abbott Munn. Corp., SOOtion 700 ;· CwrtninlJha·m, 
ys. Seattle, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 629, and note (40 Wash. 59, 82 
Pac. 143; Brown vs. District of Colu,.mbia, 29 App~ 273, 25 
L. R. A. (N·. S.) 98; Phoenix Ass·ur. Co. vs. Fire Dept., 117 
Ala. 631, 23 Sou. 843; Firemen's Benev. Asso. vs. Lounsbury, 
21 Til. 511, 7 4 Am. Dec. 115.'' 
· The protection of the lives and property of its citizens be.: 
ing a duty· of the State, the exercise or discharge of this duty 
by a political sub-division of the States does not make it 
any the less a publ~c duty and one in \Vhieh the State is di-
rectly interested and for which it is primarily' responsible. 
Burch vs. Hardwicke, 71 Va. 24., It is in the public in-
terest that men of skill and daring be employed for this 
hazardous work. There is no surer \vay of obtaining the 
courageous service \Vhich the nature of their duties requires 
than ·through securing to those engaged in it some measure 
of relief from the intimidating fear of bodily disability ·or 
death resulting in deprivation of their immediate dependents . 
.. In Cobbs, City T·reas., vs. Home Ins. Co. of N. Y., 91 Sou. 
(Ala.) 627, a writ of error was denied by the Supreme Court 
of .Ala:bama, 91 Sou. (Ala.) 922. This was a suit instituted 
by the city treasurer of the City of lfontgomery, Alabama; 
for . the use and benefit of the board of trustees of the fire-
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pany to recover a percentage of the company's gross pre-
miums from its business in the City of Montgomery during 
the year 1919, pursuant to the provisions of an act of the 
State of Alabama, requiring each fire insurance company 
doing business in the city to pay annually into a certain fund 
a sum equal to one-half of one per eent of the gross premiums 
on business done in said city during the preceding year. A 
demurrer was filed attacking the constitutionality of the act. 
The court said: 
. "It is contended for appellee that the act undertakes to., 
create a pension system pure and simple, and to grant to 
members of the fire departments in the various cities, in the_ 
class named, extra fee or allowance after service shall have. 
been rendered or contract made. '* • • Looking to the future,· 
and not retrospectively, the Legislature- may· provide a sys-
tem, whereby municipalities, having under their jurisdiction 
lJlillions of dollars' worth of property, liruble to destruction 
by :fire, can increase in efficiency a department designed to 
protect life and prope1~ty, by providing for the members of 
its fire departments, their wives ~nd little ones, after the 
term of active service has been ended, either by death or age, 
to the end that the public may retain in ·this hazardous serv-
ice men of the most faithful and efficient class. • "" 8 The com.-
pensa.tion thus paid, by whatever name called, is not a gra-
t~·ity, bu.t a pa.rt of the stipulated consideration, for ~vhich. 
they contracted a-nd served. 1l!Jahon vs. Bd. of Education, 171 
N. Y. 263, 63 N. E. 1107; Exempt Firetnen's B. Fund vs. 
Roome, 93 N.Y. 313, 45 Am. Rep. 217; State ex rel Haber~· 
lan vs. Love, 89 Nehr. 149, 131 N. W. 196; Ta.ylor vs Mott, 
123 Cal. 497, 56 Pac. 256. The section of the Nebraska Con7 
stitution (A.rticle 3, Section 16) discussed in the Love case, 
supra, is very similar to Section 68 of our Constitution, and 
the constitutions of other States discussed in the a-bove cited 
eases are of the same import. * * * The law does not violat~ 
Section 68 of the· Constitution of 1901. 
It will be seen from a reading of the authorities cited above 
that the levy of the tax or license of one-half of one per cent 
is for public and not for private use, and this view is upheld 
in an exhaustive and ab~e opinion delivered by the late Chief 
Justice Drickell in Phoenix Ass1.t.ratl-ce Co. vs. Fire Dept. of 
the City of .1.11 ontgomery, 117 Ala. 631, 23 Sou. 843, 42 L. 
R. A. 468, in a case similar to the one now under considera-
tion, and we cannot add to the argument there made.'' (I tal~ 
ics ours.) · · · 
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In Cutting, City Treas., vs. Taylo'r, State Auditor, 3 S. D. 
11, 51 N:. W. (S.D.) 949, a. statute of the Sta.te of South Da-
kota requiring insurance companies to pay into the State 
treasury as taxes two and one-half per cent of the gross 
amount of the pren1iums received in the territory during the 
preceding year was attacked as unconstitutional and the court 
said (p. 16): 
· "It is an appropriation to a proper governmental and 
public purpose, and is received by the fire companies not as a 
donation or gift, but as fairly and fully earned and justly 
paid. The appropriation is not made from motive of charity 
but as a matter of business policy and for which the fire com-
panies render an equivalent, which the State, as it has power 
to do, has undertaken in advance, to accept as a full consid-
eration thereof.'' -
The 'vhole question is more carefully and comprehensively 
considered in the case of Phoenix Assurance Co1npany vs. 
Fire Departmmtt of the City of Montgomery, 23 Sou. (Ala.) 
843, than in any other case which has come to our attention. 
This case was a suit by the .fire department to recover a pen-
alty of $1,000.00 because the insurance company, without 
paying to the :fire department the sum of $200.00, opened an. 
office in the City of Montgomery, received premiums and 
took risks against losses by fire. The court said: 
"The purpose for which this tax is imposed are not pri-
vate or individual; nor is it a stimulus to the performance 
of a private individual duty, as distinguished from a public 
duty; nor are the benefits the public are expected to derive 
contingent or incidental. The prevention and S'ltppression 
of calamities, involving the destntction of property, peril to 
life, the disturbance of p·ublic securittJ, is a ,qovern1nental func-
tion and d·uty, aid and assistance in· which it is the duty!, 
of every citizen to render. 'Sacred as are the rights of pri-
vate property, jealous as is the law of every infringement or 
invasion of them, emergencies or occasions may arise in which 
they are subordinate and must yield to public necessity. 
Salus populi s·up1~ema lex, is a maxim founded on the 'im-
plied assent on the part of every member of society that his 
own individual welfare shall, in cases of necessity, yield to 
that of the community, and that his property, liberty, and 
life shall, under certain circumstances, be placed· in jeopardy, 
or even sacrificed, for the public good'. Broom, Legal Max-
ims, p. 1. 
• • 
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· The tax is · itnposed on -all fire ins~tra;nce co1npanies, 
·whether foreign, or domestic, and in this resp·ect is unlike the 
New York, Illinois, and Wisconsin- statutes, which were lint-
ited to foreign comprHnies. The appellee is a foreign, not a 
domestic, company; and as to it, the stat~tte ma;y be regarded, 
as it 'was regarded by the New York and Wisconsin cou.rts .• 
a·s prescribin.g a condition u,.pon which lawfully it could do 
business within the designated locality. It is more in accord-
ance with our ·.Constitution and our. theories of constitutional 
construction to regard it as it was intended by the legisla-
ture-as a tax, and not as a police r€gulation; and, as such, 
it was regarded by the supreme court in Illinois, in Firemen's 
Benev . .Asso. vs. Lo~tnsbury, 21 Ill. 511, 74 Am. Dec. 115. It 
is not infrequent that statutes have for their objects the rais-
ing of revenue and the police of the State, and blending therr1 
is not offensive to the ~Constitution. Battle vs. Mobile, 9 Ala. 
234, 44 Am. Dee. 438; Youngblood vs. Sexton, 32 Mich. 406, 
20 Am. R·ep. 654." (Italics ours.). . 
· In the case of Commonwealth vs. Walton, 38 At.l. (Pa.) 
790, an ordinance passed by the City of Philadelphia appro-
priating $10,000.00 for tl1e use of a police pension fund was 
attacked as unconstitutional. The court said: 
''A judiciously administered pension fund is doubtless a 
potent agency in securing and retaining the services of the. 
most faithful and efficient class of men connected with that 
arm of the municipal service in which property. owners and 
residents of the city are most vitally interested. Reasons in 
support of this proposition need not be stated in detail. They 
are such as readily suggest themselves to every reflecting 
mind.'' 
And see People ex rel Koner VR • .Abbott, 113 N. E. (Ill.) 
696. 
In the case of Bowler vs. Nagel, 200 N. W. (~Iich.) 258, a 
constitutional provision that ''no oity or village shall have 
power * ~ * to loan its -credit nor to asses, levy or collect any 
tax or assessment for other than a public purpose'' was held 
not violated by a provision for a pension for municipal em-
ployees, the court saying: 
''The wages paid them is usually but sufficient to enable 
them to live comfortably. Many calls are made upon their 
bounty by relatives and friends whose necessities appeal to 
them. Unlike the -business men, whose only thought, as a 
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rule, is the accumulation of wealth, they feel· it a duty to re-
spond to such calls. * »> • · . 
The day is· happily past when the· employer of labor feels. 
no interest in the future of his employees. • • " The benefi-
cial results to the employer are more marked when the em:.. 
ployee is in the service of the public than when in the service 
of a private party. • • • 
The moneys· to be paid to retiring employees under the· 
amendment are not gratuities. They are annuities, commonly 
Qalled pensions, and in the nature of compensation for serv-
ice theretofore rendered. Provisions for .such payments to 
~rtain Federal "Officials and officers, soldiers and sailors and· 
. the power of Congress to provide therefor, although .not ex-
pressly conferred by the ~,ederal constitution, has been up-
held. United States vs. Hall, 98 U ~ S. 343, 35 Law ··Ed. 180.' ,. 
And finally the court held : 
''That the money which will be expended under _this arnend-
Jjlent is for 'a. public purpose' we have no doubt. The an-· 
nuities, or pensions, if you please, to he paid under it, are not 
gratuities, but ~n the nature of ~dditional compensation for 
valuable: services rendered to the city.'' 
The co11:tention that the funds derived from a tax upon· 
insurance companies· such as that levied by' the act in question 
become public funds and belong to the State and that the 
State is prohibited from giving to the municipalities .. any of 
her moneys or things of value, was disposed of in the case. 
of Citizens Ins. Co. vs. Hebert, 71 Sou. (La.) 955. In that 
case the court said (p. 957): 
''We experience no difficulty in disposing of that conten-
tion. Very true, instead of having this money merely pass 
through her treasury on its wa.y to the beneficiaries, the state 
might have had it remain there, like her other moneys, for 
defraying her own expen~es; -and in that sense the money is· 
hers, and when she directs it to be turned over to the munici-
pal :fire departments she in a sense gives it to them. But if 
it were not for the special need of this money on the part 
of these municipal fire departments, and also of the peculiar 
relation in which they stand, or are supposed to stand, to: 
wards these fire insurance companies, serving to protect thent 
from loss, this contribution. would probably not be exacted 
at all, so that the state is in reality giving nothing~by this· 
statute, parting with nothing, .but merely exercising b(lt~ 
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sovereig~ power in behalf of her municipalities for providing 
them with these funds from the expenditure of which the in-
surance companies, it is supposed, will derive a special 
benefit.'' 
And in the case of Lage vs. Cit·y of 1J1arshalltown, 235 N. 
W. (·Iowa) 761, the .Supreme Court of Iowa, in referring· to 
the cases providing for the payment of pensions to firemen, 
said: 
"In numerous of the cases referred to, as an examination 
thereof will show, the court held that the statutory provision 
for awarding· pension to police officers and firemen consti~ 
tutes an inducement thereto to enter and remain in service, 
and that the pension allowed is in the nature of compensa-
tion. In other of the cited cases pensions are referred to as 
mere bounties or gratuities allowed by law to retired or dis-
abled police officers and firemen. The constitutionality of 
statutes enacted in the various states has, however, been uni-
formly sustained upon the ground that they are awarded fo1: 
a public purpose and are not in any strict sense gifts or 
_bounties. Statutes providing for mere gifts to such officers 
would clearly transcend constitutional limitations. Gray vs. 
City of Salen~ (~iass.), 171 N. E. 432." 
Finally, we turn to the recognized constitutional authority 
in support of the validity of the exercise by the Virginia. Gen-
eral Assembly of its power to impose this tax upon the fire 
.insurance -companies, namely, Cooley's Constitutional Limi-
_tations, Eighth Edition, Volume 2, where, at page 1030, we 
find: 
"It iwnst always be con.ceded that the proper author·ity to 
detennine wha·t Hhould a1~d what should not constitute a. pub-
lic bnrden, is the legislative departrnent of the State. This 
is not only true for the State at large, but it is true also in re-
spect to each municipality or political division of the State; 
these inferior corporate existences having only such au-
thority in this regard as the leg-islature shall eonfer upon 
them. And in detern1ining this question, the legislature can-
not be held to any narrow or techni~al rule. Not only are 
certain expenditures absolutely essential to the continued ex-
istence of the government and the performance of its or-
dinary funetions, but as a matter of policy it ma.y son1etimes 
he proper and wise to assume other burdens ·which rest en-
tirely on considerations of honor, gratitude or eharity. The 
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officers of government must be paid, the laws printed, roads 
constructed, and public buildings erected; but with a view to 
the _general well being of society, it may ·also be important 
tl1at the children of the S'tatc should be educated, the poor 
kept from starvation, losses in the public service indemni-
fied, and incentives held out to faithful and fearless discharge 
of duty in the future, by the payment of pensions to those 
who have been faithful public servants in the past. There 
will, therefore, be necessary expenditures, and expenditures 
which rest upon considerations of policy only, and, in regard 
to the one as much as to the other, the decision of that de-
partment to which alone questions of State policy are ad-
dressed must be accepted a.s conclusive." (Italics ours.) 
And the text of, this constitutional authority continues with 
quotations from the highest courts of the State of Connecti-
cut, the. State of Wisconsin and the State of Pennsylvania in 
its support. The quotation from th~ Supreme Court of the 
State of Wisconsin is from the case of Brodhead vs. Mil-
wau,lcee, 19 Wis. 624, 652, that: 
''To justify the court in arresting the proceedings and de-
claring the tax void, the absence of all possible public inter-
est in the purpose for which the funds are raised must be 
cl~ar and palpable; so clear ~nd palpable as to be perceptible 
by every mind at the first blush.'' 
In the case of Fire Department of JY!ilwaulcee vs. H elf en~ 
stein and others, 16 Wis. 136, 1.6 Villas and Bryant 142, the 
statute requiring any individual or association not incor· 
porated by the la~s of Wisconsin to pay to the treasurer two 
dollars upon every hundred upon the amount of premiums on 
insurance for insurance in the City of Milwaukee, was at-
tacked as unconstitutional. The court said: 
''The percentage of the permiums directed to be paid for 
the benefit of the fire department, is in no just sense a tax 
upon the agent or upon his occupation or business. The in~ 
tention of the Legislature and the effect of the act are, to 
go back of the agent and reach the company which he rep--: 
resents. Nor is the requirement an exercise of the· power 
for taxation as to the companies, but only a proper exercise 
of the police' power inherent in the sovereignty of: the State~'' 
New York Board of Fire. Underwriters vs. Whipple, 37 N. 
Y. S. 712, is a case to recover an assessment levied upon the 
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premiums received. by an insurance agency for insurance is-. 
sued in the City of New York under the provisions of a statute 
of the State of New York. 
The act incorporated a. large number of the officers of in-
surance companies and associations as the New York Board 
. of Fire Underwriters. The corporation was empowered to 
create a fire patrol, to regulate the powers to be given to 
that patrol and the statute prescribed the manner 'in which 
the money to pay the expenses of the patrol should be raised 
and collected. The money was not, so far as the opinion dis-
closes, to be used for any pensions or disability benefits. The 
court said (p. 715): 
''The right to levy this assessment for the purposes pro-
vided for in this act is not the levy of a tax, but it is to be 
sustained as an exercise by the Legislature of its police 
power in the regulations of business. • • • The existence of 
what is known as the 'Police power' in the Legislature by 
which it is authorized to exercise a regulating and controlling 
power over the internal affairs of State, is well settled. It is 
equally well settled that such a power is far reaching. ·Cooley 
Const. Li. 713 et seq. In the nat-ure of things, of -course, it is 
difficult to define it; and it is almost impracticable, in gen-
eral words, to set any limit to its existence, or to lay down 
any general rules within which it must be brought before the 
exercise of it -can be sustained. It has been .said-:-and such 
appears ~o be the current of authority-that 'it authorizes the 
government of the State to .regulate the conduct of its citi-
zens towards each other and, when necessary for the public 
good, the manner in which each shall use his own property. 
1vlunn vs. Ill., 94 U. S. 113. The question of the extent of the 
police power is -considered fully by Judge Cooley in his 
learned work on constitutional limitations, and he comes to 
the conclusion that any property or business which is affected 
with the public interests is amenable to the police power of 
the State, and that any business is said to be affected with 
the public interests where 'vith the following of it was not 
as of right, but was permitted by the S'tate as a privilege 
or franchise, or where exclusive privileges are granted in 
consideration of some special return to be made to the pub-
lic. ·Cooley Constitutional Limitations, Section 746. * • oR: 
Although at one time the business of insurance in this State 
was one which might be followed by anybody, and with re-
gard to which no restrictions were imposed, yet that for many 
years has ceased to be the case. Not only is that business 
now regulated by many laws but the pursuing of it is for-
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bidden, except by certain persons, who are licensed and au-
thorized for that purpose, and who thereoy receive from the 
State a privilege to pursue it apart from other persons. It 
has been the policy of the State, for many years, to regulate 
and control this business, in view of its great extent, ~be 
great interest involved in it, and the serious damage to the 
great body of citizens which mig-ht result if the busines~ was 
entirely without control. The rig-ht to thus control it can 
· hardly .be questioned in this day. For that reason, people 
exercising the business of insurance in this State are clearly 
within the control of the ·public power, because, as is said 
in the cases abov:e cited, they have a virtual m~nopoly of th~ 
business by the g-rant of the .State. * * * The act requires all 
persons 'vho are eng·ag-ed in the business of insurance in the 
City of New York to render to the corporation organized by 
it a return of the amount of prenliums received by them dur; 
ing certain months of the year, and authorizes the corpora-
tion to charg-e upon all persons ·engaged in that business such 
sum as may be necessary to pay the expenses of the fire pa-
trol, not exceeding two per cent of the amount of the pre-
miums received by them.* :e * vVithin the principles laid down 
above, we think the power of the Legislature to impose upon 
persons authorized to issue insurance in this city the duty of 
taking this step to preserve life and property from fire can-
not be questioned. • ~ * . '' 
It was held. irr Thompson vs. 1Jile1nph,is, 251 S. W. (Tenn.). 
46, that the action of a city in taking out group insurance 
for its employees in its 'vater department was not unconsti-
tutional as an appropriation of public funds for private pur-
poses. The court said : 
"Upon the principle here involved-that is, of better a11d 
continued service, and more wholesome water-various courts 
have sustained statutes requiring cities to pension -firemen 
and policemen. Such an act was sustained in State ex 'ret 
Haberlan vs. Love, 89 Nebr. 149, 131 N. W. 196, the court say-
ing: 'A fireman's ·pension may be classified as part of his 
compensation for services rendered or it may be said that 
it is paid to him for the purpose of stimttlating all those en-
gaged in a like public duty to prevent and suppress the de-
struction of property and the loss of human life incident to 
those conflagrations "rhich the utmost vigilance may mini-
mize, .but cannot entirely prevent, in populous cities. Within 
whichever class the pension n1ay fall, public funds may be 
~ppropriated in conformity with legislative authority or to 
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pay the fireman, and the n1oney jis thereby expended for a 
public purpose.' ' 
Further on ·in the opinion the court said t 
'In applying these· limitations to the instant case, it may 
be conceded that the pension fot?ns an induceme.nt to the 
individual to enter a.nd rema.in irt the service of the fire de-
J)artment, and that the pension in a sense is part of the -com-: 
pensation paid for those services.' '' · 
In the case of Oray vs. City of Sale-Jn, 171 N. E. (1\IIass.) 
432, · the· court said : , 
I 
"We agree that the Legislature has no constitutional au-
thority to suspend a. general law for the benefit of an indi-
vidual • * * . The Legislature has t!onstitutional power to 
grant pensions to select individuals. Opinion of the ,Jus-
tices, 175 1\Iass. 599; 57 N. E. H75; Opinion of the Justices, 
190 Mass. 611, 77 N. E. 820; Opinion of the Justices, 211 
1\l[ass. 608, 98 N. E. 338; Opinion of the Justices, 240 Mass. 
616, 136 N. E. 157. The grant transcends the power only. 
when no legitimate public· good is to be derived from it-'-
' where the only public advantage~ is such as may be incident 
and collateral to the relief of a private citizen'. It is estab-
lished law that grants of pensions to military veterans who 
have become incapacitated in the ]public service may be madt~ 
by the Legislature and ordered i paid ·by cities or towns.'' 
And see Opinion of the Justices, 154 Atl. (N.H.) 217, hold-
ing that the support of paupers is a valid exercise of au-
thority under State police power in promotion of the gen-
eral welfare (Supreme Court of New Hampshire) despite 
the fact that the constitution of the Sta.te of New Hampshire 
provides that "pensions will no~ be granted except in eon-
sideration of ·actual services * * * for more than one year at 
a time'' ahd that the constitution of that State also pro.hibits 
taxation for private purposes. And see Carr vs. Roesch, 
246 N. Y. S. 628. i 
See Sta,te ex rel. Gorczyca vs. lJfinneapolis, 219 N. W. 
(Minn.) 924. 11 • 
Com1no1~wealth vs. Barke1~, 211 Pa. 610, 61. Atl. 253. This 
was a case in which a 1nandamus was filed against the city 
treasu·rer and city clerk to compel paytnents of money un-
der an ordinance of the City of S'cranton, Pennsylvania. The 
ordinance was attacked as an un~onstitutional appropriation 
of public funds. The court sail (p. 613): 
I 
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"The ordinance in question was a valid a~d sufficient ap-· 
propriation of the fund to ·the use of appellant, at least for the 
current year of its passage. * * 9 
The objection that the ordinance is in violation of Article 
IX, Section 7 of the Constitution prohibiting municipal ap-
propriations for 'any corporation, association, institution or 
individual' is not tena.ble * • * . The protection of the city 
from fire is a municipal function of the highest importance; 
an,d as said in the case just cited 'a judiciously administered 
pension fund is doubtless a potent agency in securing the 
services of the most faithful and efficient class of men'." 
The court, however, affirmed the opinion ~f the lower ~court 
upon the ground that the ordinance had been repealed after 
the institution of the suit and that no mandamus could be 
obtained against the city treasurer and the city clerk to per-
form a duty which had ·existed only as a result of an ordinance 
which duty had been removed subsequent to the institution 
of the suit by the repeal of the ordinance. However, the 
court held that whether· the city could terminate Barker's 
rights, under the original ordinance, could only be settled in a 
suit directly against the city. The case is authority for the 
holding that an ordinance appropriating public funds for fire-
men's pension funds is constitutional. The opinion in the 
case was not in terms based upon the police power. 
It was held in the case of Rheinhart vs. State, 117 S. W. 
(Tenn.) 508, that fire insurance companies could be taxed to 
provide a fund to investigate causes of. fires. It is equally' 
true, we maintain, that the fire insurance companies may be 
taxed to provide a fund for the use of firemen in a manner 
which will create greater efficiency, diligence and daring on 
their part in the prevention and suppression of :fires. And 
as· has already been argued, these fire insurance companies 
are the greatest beneficiaries of the services rendered by 
firemen. 
It is a matter of common knowledge that in times of great 
public unrest, ~remen are frequently called upon to protect 
public· life and property in the emergency created by riots. 
Their services are not limited to fire fighting. They consti-
~ute an arm of the public service which is frequently used in 
the execution of the general police powers which are primarily 
the obligation of the State to discharge. They are required to· 
enforce fire regulations in theatres, and other public build-· 
ings, to inspect premises and buildings for the detection of" 
fire hazards and to take appropriate means to eliminate such 
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c~~e these publie duties which ar~ owing by the Stat·e t~ its;. 
c1hzens. _ . -
It is, .therefore, submitted that :the tax pro~ided under the. 
legisJation under consideratio~ is for a public purpose and, 
therefore, not offensive to 1Sectibn 188 of the Constitution. 
• - - ! .• 
(e) The- complain.ant contends that the Act is in violatio1i 
of Section ·185 of the Constitution of Virginia which' pro-
vides, in part, that ne·ither the cr~dit of the State, nor of any 
county, city or toum, shall be, directly o1· indirectly,--~Whd~·r 
a'I~'!J device or pretense whartsoe~er, granted to or in :atid of 
any person, association, or corpb'ration, nor shall .the State 
assume a;ny indebtedenss of any cottnty, city or town, nor lentl' 
its credit to the same. 
· Section 185 of the ConstitutioJ reads as -follows: 
I. 
''Neither the credit of the State, nor of any county, Gity 
or town, shall be, directly or indirectly, under any device or 
pretense whatsoever, granted to br in aid of any person, as-
sociation, or corporation, nor shall the State, or any county, 
city, or town subscribe to or becpme interested in the· stock 
or o}?ligatio~s of f:tny company, assooiation,. or corporation, 
for the purpose of aiding in the construction or maintenance of 
its work; nor shall the State become a party to or become in-
terested in any work of internal [improvement, except public 
roads and public parks, or eng·age in carrying on any such 
work; nor assume any indebtedrless of any county, city, or 
town, nor lend its credit to the same; but this section shall 
not prevent a county, city, or town from perfecting a sub-
scription to the capital stock of a railroad company author-
ized by existing charter condition~d upon the affirmative vote 
of the voters and freeholders o~ such county, city, or town 
in favor of such subscription; provided, that such vote was 
had prior to July first, nineteen hundred and three.'' 
· The contention apparently is -here made that the act of-
fends that part of the constitu~ional provision providing 
that neither the credit of the St~te, nor of any county, city 
or town, shall-be, directly 9r indirectly, under any device or 
pretense whatsoever, granted to or in aid of any person, 
association, or corporation. From a casual reading of the 
Rection, the only prohibition is against the use of the credit 
of the State. Clearly this see:rds to refer to something in 
the nature of an obligation or bond, neither of which i~ con-
cerned in this case or under this act. In other words, the 
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design is apparently to prevent ~rtcurring an obligation for 
the purposes named. No obligation is conten1plated in this 
act. All that is contemplated is a future appropriation by the 
General Assembly.. _ · 
This section was considered in Holston Corp vs. Wise 
O'ounty, 131 Va. 142. In that case a county, before it ad-
vertised for bids from c-ontractors for road work, made a 
· contract with a ·corpora.tion to furnish crushed stone to any 
and all contractors to 'vhom the 'vork might be_ su bsequent.ly 
let at a special price, and in consideration of the furnishing 
of the stone for such use at such price, the county; on its part, 
g'naraute~d to the corporation payment for the same. The 
court held that this contract did not fall within the inhibition 
of the above section of the Constitution~ saying (p. 157): 
''Section 185 of the Constitution of Virginia; so far as 
materia], reads as follows: 
'Neither the credit of the State, nor of any county * * · *. 
shall be directly or indirectly, under any device or pretense 
whatsoever, granted to or in aid of any ·persont association or 
corporation· • ~ ~ / 
The contract in question did not directly or indirectly in 
~:tny way whatsoever grant 'the credit' of the county 'to or 
in aid of any person, association or corporation '• Tliat would 
have been true if the object of the contra.ct had been to bene-fit 
the contractors in any way, as, for example, to enable any 
of them to obtain the stone on the credit of the county, when 
upo~ their own credit they could not have obtained it; or to 
enabJe. any of the contractors to make a greater profit by 
obtaining the stone at a reduced price because df the pledge· 
of the credit of the county. Rut the contractors were nht 
expected and couJd not in the nature of the case derive any 
benefit from the contract, and it was not made fo1" their 
benefit. It was 1nade solely for the benefit of the cqunty 
itself, ancl not for or in aid of any other. The contractors for 
the road work would emhrace the item of the cost of the 
stone at the fixed price mentioned; so that nothing would be 
added thereto because of the possible fluctuation in price ol· 
of inability to obtain the stone at that price; and hence it 
was expected by the county that by reason of such co1itract 
with appollant ·u 'vould receive a direct benefit in obtaining 
contracts with the contractors for the road work for a les~ 
total contract price than could have been otherwise secured. 
And doubtless this was the result. But whether it w·as or not, 
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this expected benefit to the county was the sole ·reason for its 
making the -contract with appellant, and hence the credit of 
the county was used by itself and for its own benefit alone.'' 
Again it is apparent from thi~ holding of this Court that 
the· question to be considered untler Section 185 is the sanw 
question which has been fully l covered before under con-
sideration of Section 188 of the Constitution, so that the whole 
question is as to whether the act -considered in this case was 
for a public purpose. Reference is a-ccordingly made to the 
citation of the cases, supra, set £orth under consideration of 
paragraph (d) covering Sectiouf188 of the Constitution of 
Virginia. ' · 
(f) The cmnplainant contends that the act is in violation of 
Section 63 of the Con::Jtit~e.t-iun of Vit·ginia which prot,ides, 
it~t· paTt, that the General .A.ssem~ly shall not enact ooy local, 
special or private law fot· the qssessment and collection of 
taxes ,i;ranting fro1n the treasury of the State, or .(JrOIYiling, 
or au.tlwr·izin,g to be gra1~ted fron~ the treasury of any politi-
cal sub-division thereof, a1~y ext:ra com.pen.sation to any pub-
lic officer, servant, agent, or con~ractor, 01· gra1~ting tvny petti-
sion, or ,qran.ti'rtg any p·rivate cortJoration, assoc:iation, or in-
dividual any special or exclusi+e 1·ight, privilege or im-
munity. I . 
Section 63 of the Constitution of Virginia reads, so far as 
here material, as follows: 
I 
''The authority of the gener~l assembly shall extend to 
all subjects of legislation, not he~~ein forbidden or restricted; 
and a specific grant of authority in this Constitution upon a 
subject shall not work a restriction of its authority npon 
the same or any other subject. The omission in this Consti-
tution of· specific grants of authority heretofore- conferred 
shall not be -construed to deprive jthe general assembly of such 
authority, or to indicate a change of policy in reference there-
to, unless such purpose plainly appear. 
The general assen1bly shall confer on the courts power to 
grant divorces, change the nam~s of persons and direct the 
sale of estates be~ong·ing to infants and other persons un-
der legal disabilities, and shalli not, by special legislation, 
grant relief in these or other c~se~ of which the courts or other 
tribunals may have jurisdiction~ 
The g·eneral assen1bly n1ay reg·ula te the exercise by courts 
of the right to punish for cont~mpt. 
• 
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The general assembly shall not enact any local, ·special ·or 
private law in the following cases : 
• • ... 
10. Granting from the treasury of the State, or granting, 
-or authorizing to be gTanted from the treasury of any politi-
cal subdivision thereof, any extra compensation to any pub-
lic officer, servant, agent, or contractor~ 
• • 
13. Granting any pension. 
• ... 
18. Granting to any private corporation, association, or in-
dividual any special or exclusive right, privilege or h;n-
munity.'' 
Obviously, the first question to be considered is whether 
the act in question here is a local, special or private law, be-
cause, if it is not, it does not come within any of the pro-
hibited classes. It is submitted that the act in question is 
general, and not local, special or private. 
It is true that the Act applies to only non-mutual fire and 
lightning insurance companies or associations, and to only 
such of these as insure property in cities, towns ·or counties 
having a fire company or fire department, and further that 
only the premiums received for insuring property in such 
cities, towns and counties is made the basis of the tax but 
this does not make the Act either private, loc~l or special leg-
islation, since the Act applies to all within the State belong-
ing to th~t class without distinction. 
A case somewhat similar to the present case is that of 
Bertram vs. Commo-nwealth, 108 Va. 902. In that case, the 
legislative act was attacked as being a special law entitled, 
''An act to incorporate the 'Virginia Pharmaceutical As-
sociation' and to regulate the practice of pharmacy and to 
guard the sale of poisons in the State of Virginia". In up-
holding the validity of the statute, the court said (p. 905): 
"Lastly, it is insisted that .the present statute (sections 
1759 and 1766, Va. Code, 1904), is both a private and spe-
cial law, enacted in the interest of a. private corporation; that 
it denounces certain acts as misdemeanors affecting the in-
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terests of the 'Virginia Phai-mlceutical Association', and 
then undertakes to give 'to the . appointees of that private 
association the exclusive benepcjary .in the penalty to the 
extent of one-half the fines imposed.' These provisions, it 
is maintained, violate clauses 1 a~d 18, seetion· 63, of the .Col~~ 
stitution of 1902. I 
Clause 1 declares, that the general assembly shall not en-
act any local, special or priv:ate law for the punishment of 
crime; and clause 18, that it shall not grant to any private 
corporation, association, or individual, any special or ex-
-clusive right,. privilege or immuPity. 
Upon the first proposition, the act !s in no sense a local, 
special, or private law for the punishment of crime; because 
it applies to the State at large, and makes a violation of its 
provisions by any person a misdemeanor, punishable by fine.'' 
In Norfolk vs. Board of Trade,]loo Va. 353, an act was de-
clared constitutional as not being special or private legisla-
tion which granted to corporations organized and conducted 
in bona fide social clubs exemption from taxation. The court 
said (p. 355): 1 
I 
I . . 
"By the agreed statement of ff\cts it further appears that 
all of the conditions are met entitling defendants in error to 
the exemption from further taxation by the State for the year 
1905, and from municipal tax, for the privileges conferred 
by the statute; therefore, the solei question for our determina-
tion is the power of the legisla tt;tre to pass the act in ques-
tion. We are not required to determine whether or not there 
was a valid reason for the legislature to pass tlie act, but 
solely whether it had the power. 
The power of the legislature to enact laws upon any and 
all subjects 'is unrestrained, unless prohibited by the Consti-
tution. Conk vs. Skee1~, Judge, ~nte, p. 6, 63 S. E. 11, 2 Va. 
App. 732, 735. 
There is nothing in the Constitution in express terms pro-
hibiting the passage of the act of March 12, 1904, supra, as 
section 64 of the Constitution (fprbidding the legislature to 
pass special laws in certain cas~s, among others, ·'grant to 
any private corporation, associa~ion or individual any spe-
cial or exclusive right, priv:ilege or immunity'), has no appli~ 
cation here, the statute being a general law.'' 
In fact, this court has gone sol far as to hold that legisla-
tion applicable to counties havin~ a population greater than 
three hundred inhabitants per square mile is not a special 
I 
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law although such classification in fact includes only one 
county in Virginia, the court saying in the case of Ex Parte 
Settle, 114 Va. 715 (p. 718): 
"The sole question to be determined is as to the constitn-: 
tionality of the act authorizing the appointment of a trial 
justice of the county of Alexandria. It is insisted on behalf 
of the petitioner that the act is unconstitutional because it 
is special or class legislation prohibited by section 63 of the 
.Constitution of this State, in that it applies only to the county 
of Alexandria; that it is repugnant to section 52 of the Con-
stitution, which provides, among other things, that 'no law 
shall be revived or amended with reference to its title, bnt 
the act reviv:ed or the section amended shall be re-enacted and 
published at leng·th'; and third, that it is repugnant to section 
87 of the Constitution, which provides that 'The Judiciary 
Department shall consist of a .Supreme Court of Appeals, 
circuit courts, city courts, and such other courts as are herein-
after authorized'. 
· It is true. that the act applies only to the county of Alex-
andria, that being the only county in the State which has a 
population of three hundred or more to the square mile. 
But the fact tha.t a ·law- applies only to certain territorial dis-
tricts does not render it unconstitutional, provided it ap-
plies to all districts and all persons who are similarly situ-
ated, and to all parts of the State where like conditions ex-
ist. Laws may ·be made to a.pply to a class only, and that 
class may be in point of fact a small one, provided the classi-
fication itself be a reasonable and not an arbitrary one, and 
the law be' made to apply to all of the persons belonging to the 
class without distinction.'' 
In Grube1· vs. Co1nmonwealth, 140 Va. 312, this court had 
under consideration the n1otor v:ehicle carrier act, ·whereby 
motor vehiele carriers were required to secure from the State 
Corporation ·Commission authority to operate. In disposing 
of the contention that the act was a local, special or private 
law, the court said (p. 323): 
''There is one further arg-ument urged in behalf of the 
applicant upon the question under consideration, namely: 
That by the Constitution of the State, sections 63 and 64,-
the legislature is forbidden to enact 'any local, special or 
private law*** creating· private corporations' (or) 'grant-
ing·to any private corporation, association or individual any 
special or exclusive right, privilege or immunity'; that, hence, 
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tlie legislature itself could not g-rant a charter to A, to operate 
a bus line and deny the same rigl}t to }3., nor could it confor 
rights, powers and privileges upop A. and deny then1 to B.; 
and that, if by direct enactmen~ the legi~lature -cannot do 
this, it cannot confer such authority upon the State Cor-
poration Commission by indlreet. enactment The an·swer to 
this arg·ument is, that the statute! in question is .P.ot a ~local, 
special, or l?Iliva.te law'! It is ~ g~neral hnV) and, a~ 11ppear~ 
from wlla.t 1~ a.~nd above, a ~t&tnt~ allactod lU tho ex9rGise of 
the police power of the State is not invalid merely because~ 
as the result of disoriminations based on reasonable classi.., 
fications, it may chance that certain privileges, in the e~er­
.cise of which the public interest i is concerned, are obtained 
by some and denied tg QtheJ's. '' i. 
, In Danville War-elzo'ltse Co. vs. Tobacao Growe1's' Co,..op .. 
4.ssn., 143 Va. 741, the legislative act Fequh~ed tobacQO to be· 
sold only in the nam«:l of the t:rue.l owner, required records of 
E!al~s to be k~pt subject to in~peetion and ac-cess of the prem.,. 
ises for such purposes. The act :reeitad tlHlt its purpose was 
to prevent fraud in the handling of the sale of leaf tobacoo. 
It was argued that the motive and effect of the act were to 
promote the bush1oss of tho Tob~oBo Growere' ·Co.-operative 
..,'\.ssociatioll and to injure that df the wal.'ehousemen. The 
court held that this contention ~aised solely as a question 
of ptlhUG propriety and advanhtge, the determination of which 
belong·ecl ~~elusively to the legislative depaJ.·tn1ent of the 
governrnent, nnd Ilot to the cour~. lil. disposing of the -con-
tention that the act was a spooifil, priv:ate or local law, 1·h" 
court said (p. 763) ; 
q As to· the reason assig11ed by the appellant under (b), 
the court holds, on pag~ 209 of 14~ V a.. 92 of 126" S. E., supra., 
that, in addition, the provisions of section 63 of the State 
Constitution &re not violated by the act in question; that this 
statute appliea throughout the Stftte to all persons and prop ... 
erty withhl the cla13ses specified, ~nd that tho classification is 
reasonable a11d not arbitrary, and therefore the statute is not 
spe~ial, put general.'' I 
In Shelt01~ vs. Syd·nor, 126 Va. 603, this Court passed on an 
act claimed to be in violation of j Section 63 of the Constitu-
tion of Vh!ginia, sinoe it incl'eas~d the salary of member~ of 
the boal'd of supervisors after tliey entered offi~e. At pagn 
636 the court said: · 
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''This compensation could not be increased during their 
term of office by any local or special law.'' 
Again, at page 611 : 
"If the only limitation contained is a legitimate classifi-
cation of its objects, it is a general law. Hence if the objects 
of the law have characteristics so distinct as reasonably to 
form, for the purpose legislated upon it, a class by itself, the 
law is general; for a law is not general because it operates 
upon every person in the .State, but because every person 
that can be brought within its predicament becomes subject 
to its operation. * * * 
The act amends Section 848 of the -Code on the subject of 
compensation of supervisors generally, and classifies their 
compensation by the population of the counties, and in these 
respects the act is general and unobjectionable, but, among 
other provisions, it then proceeds to separate from the gen-
eral classification and to provide a different compensation 
for 'each member of the board of supervisors' in fifteen coun-
ties by name.'' 
See also Reaves W arehou.se C o1·poration vs. Cammon-
wealth, 141 Va. 194; AnthonJJ vs. Com1nonwealth, 142 Va. 
577; Farmer vs. Christian, J'ltdge, 152 S. E. (Va.) 382; COAnp-
bell vs. City of Danville, 138 Va.. 817; Ex Parte Settle, 114 
Va. 718; Commonwealth vs. United Cigarette Machine Co., 
120 V a. 841 ; M art·~n vs. C otn1nonwealth, 126 V a. 603; Str(J!UJ-
berry Hill Land Corp. vs. Sta.rb'ltck, 124 Va. 71. 
It must, therefore, be borne in mind that the General As-
sembly is not prohibited from passing the laws set forth un-
der Section 63, but only in event that the law shall be a local, 
special or private law. It would, therefore, seem clear that 
since the act in question is a general act applying to the vari-
ous fire departments and a general act requiring a. tax of 
certain generally specified insurance companies, that it does 
not offend this Constitution. Therefore, it would seem im-
material to consider the sub-sections of Section 63 which it 
is claimed are violated, thus making the act unconstitutionaL-
For that reason, we deem it unnecessary to give and con-
sideration whatsoever to these sub-divisions. 
(g) The co·mplainant contends that the said act contra-
venes~ Section 168 of the Constitution of Virginia which pro-· 
vi(les in part that all taxes, whether State, local or municipal:,' 
shall be uniform upon the sat~ne da~~s of subjects within the 
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territorial limits of the authority levy·ing the tax and shall 
be levied and collected under .Qefferal law. 
I 
Section 168 provides as follow~: 
• I 
''All property, except as hereinafter provided, shall be 
taxed; all taxes, whether State, local or municipal, shall be 
uniform upon the same elass of subjects within the territorial 
limits of the authority levying ~he tax, and shall be levied 
and collected under generalla,v. I, The general assembly may 
define and classify taxable subjects, and, except as to classes 
of property herein expressly segregated for either State or 
local taxation, the general asse~bly may segregate the sev-
eral classes of property so as to specify and determine upon 
what subjects S.tate taxes, and upbn what subjects local taxes 
may be levied. '' · 
The requirement of Section ]68 of the Virginia Consti-
tution is that taxes shall be uniform upon the same "class 
of subjects'' within the territorial limits of the authority 
levying the tax. The Legislatur~ by the Act in question has 
made that class such non-mutual fire and lightning insurance 
companies as do business in cities, towns and counties which 
have fire companies or fire departments and wherever that 
subject or class is found witliin the territorial limits of the 
State, the tax is imposed. I 
When the authority levying the tax, whether it be State, 
local or municipal, meets this requirement, the relief for 
those who feel unjustly burdened] is not to the courts, but to 
the justness and fairness of thej representatives composing 
t'-he body ·which levied the tax . 
.As this Court stated in Bradley vs. Richtnond, 110 Va. 521, 
525, where a license tax on priv:a~e bankers was upheld: 
''The power of taxation, under\ our system of government, 
rests ·with the legislative and not with the judicial depart-
ment, and its province cannot He invaded by the oourts. 
Where the power to tax for revenue purposes exists, the 
amount of the tax is in the discretion of the legislative body, 
and it may be carried to any exjtent within the jurisdiction 
of the State or corporation which imposes it which the will 
of such State or corporation may prescribe. If the power 
is exercised in any unwise, unjust and oppressive manner 
to any particular class, the re~edy, within constitutional 
bounds, is by an appeal, not to the courts, but to the justice 
and patriotism of the representatives of the people. Ould; 
. I . 
~tc., vs, Riahntond, s·upra·; Oon~mon-wealth vs. Moore, suprn; 
Norfolk vs. Not·folk L.andntark, supra; W oodalt vs~ Ly'ltch~, 
burg, 100 Va. 318, 40 S. E. 91.5." 
Section 168 of the Virginia Constitution requiring equality 
· &nd un.iformity of ta~ation appli~s only to a. direot. ta:J: on 
property a-nd not such a ta:~ a!i; lS Imposed by tile act 1n ques-
tion which is in the nature of a licansa tu.~ fen: the privilege . 
of doing busmes~. · · 
. As st~t~d in Br(~trll~JI vs. RiCJlnnmrd, $Upt"a: 
. ''Tho provi~iQllS in the Con~titutio.n re1uirhtg equa.lity and 
tlniformity of btxation apply only to a direct ta:x QJl prop-
erty, and not to IieenfiJe taxol:l, whiGh do uot adnlit n tax strictly 
equal and uniform in the sense contended for; Helfrick's 
Case, 29 Gratt. 844. When sections 168 and 170 of the ·Con-
stitution ara read tQgethet' it is alear that it was not in-· 
tended to include a license tax npon a business in any of 
th.~ provision~ spealdng of taxes on property. It was conl-
pet~n.t for th~ council to assign private banker~ to diffel·ent 
cla,.sses, and the plaintiff in error was required to pay on. 
g-reater licen.~~ ta~ than all others in the sa1nc class with. 
himself. In order to render tho classification illegal, the party 
assailing jt muat sho·w that ·the business discriminated 
against is precisely the same as that included in the class 
which is all~ged to be favored. Norfolk, ete., vs. N arfolk, 105 
Va, 139, 52 S. E. 851, 'l'hi~ has not been a.hown in the pres.-
ent case. On the contrary, it appears tl1at tho business of 
the plaintiff in erro~~ is not preo'isely the same with tlult of 
other private bankers who are put in a different Qlass and as,.. 
sessed with a less license t{IX.' 7 
In Poca.hontas Co. vs. Co1nmonwealth, 113 Va. 108, the Court 
held valid a taA on deeds of triJst of internal improvement 
compllnies Jlleasured by mileag·e in this State when others 
were taxed re.gardles~ ·of property in thi~ State, saying ( p, 112}: . . 
''ln the first place, this is not a tax upon property, either 
within or out of the State, but a ta.x upon a civil privilege, 
th~t is, for the pl'ivilege of ttvailing·~ upon the term~ pr~­
scribed by ~tatnte, of tlie benofits a.ud advu.ntages of the I'cg-
istratiQn laws of the State. Therefore, the numerous au-
thorities aited and ably presented altd argued by the l~arned 
con:n~el fol.~ appellant, in support of the contention tl1at tlw. 
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assessment and collection of the tax in question violated tl1e 
said provision of the ·Constitution of the United States, have 
no sort of bearing: upon the issue 
1




(P. 112 :) I ' 
''A tax ou property is measured on its assessment and col-
lection in the mode prescribed by statute, while a tax upon 
a license or civil privilege is imposed and .fixed as to atnount 
J:>y classification of the persons or subjects required to pay 
the tax; and the powers of the legislature to impose the lat ... 
ter tax, to fix the amount thereof,. and to classify the subjects 
upon which the tax is imposed, ~re well-night unlimited, so 
long as the classification is reaspnahle. 
'The power of tho State to distinguish, select, and classify 
objects of taxation, ha.s a wide 1~ange of discretion. Classi-
fication must be reasonable, but there is no precise applica-
tion of the rule of reasonableness, and there cannot be au 
exact exclusion or inclusion. of pelrsons and things.' 1 Cooley 
on Taxation (3d Ed.), p. 79, and note. 
The Supreme Court of the U hi ted States in the case of 
Nicol vs. A1nes, 173 lJ. S. 509, 19 Sup. Ct. 522, 43 L. Ed. 786-
'94, said: 'The question always, is, when a classification .is 
made, whether there is any reasonable ground for it, or 
whether it is only and siinply arpitrary, based upon no real 
distinction, and entirely unnaturl\1. * * • If the classification 
])e proper and leg·al, then there is the requisite uniformity 
in that respect.' 
The constitutional provision in this State relative to taxa-
tion is as follows: . I · 
I 
'Sec. 168. All property, except as hereinafter provided, 
shall be taxed; all taxes, whether State, local, or municipal, 
shall be unifor1n upon the same class of subjects within the 
territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall 
be levied and collected under ge;tleral laws.' 
This court held in Bradley vs. Ricll/lnond, 110 Va. 521, 66 
S. E. 872, that the foregoing· provisions in the Constitution, 
requiring equality and uniformity of taxation, apply only to 
a direct tax on property, and not to license taxes, which do 
not ad1nit of a tax strictly eql{al and uniform; and very 
clearly the privilege of recording<deeds, wills, and other writ-
ten .instruments, and thereby s~curing the benefits and ad-
vantages of the registration laws! of the ·State, like the privi-
lege of eonducting a business, is reeessarily to be considered. 
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a proper subject of taxation, with the only constitutional 
limitation upon the power of the legislature to impose the 
tax, that it shall be uniform upon the subjects of each class. 
Blaru,ghter vs. Commonu~ealth, 13 Gratt. (54 Va.) 774;- Eyre 
vs. Jacobs, supra; itliller vs. Commonwealth, 27 Gratt. (68 
Va.) 110. 
· · The statute under which the tax complained of in this case 
was demanded and paid, so far as applicable, is as follows: 
'And on deeds of trust or mortgages, the tax shall be assessed 
and paid upon the amount of bonds or other obligations se-
cured thereby;' and provided further that, 'on deeds of trust 
or mortgages upon the works and property of a railroad or 
other internal impovement company, lying vartly in this 
State and partly in another State, the tax shall be upon sucl1 
proportion of the considerafion as the number of miles of the 
line of such company in thi~ State bears to the whole number 
of miles of the line of such company conveyed by such deed.' 
Here we have a classification made which puts internal 
improvement companies, whose line is partly in Virginia and 
partly in some other States, in one class, and all other 
grantors in trust deeds or. mortgages in the other class. The 
rate of taxation is the same in all cases, and the tax is uni-
form upon the same class of subjects. That the legislature 
intended to make the classification so plainly· appearing i~ 
the statute is too clear to admit of discussion, and that the 
classification for the purpose of taxation is valid seems 
~qually as clearly settled by the decisions of this court. In 
. fact, it seems that appellant does not deny the right of the 
legislature to make such classification, but denies that the 
classification has been made. As we }}ave seen, the classifi-
cati<?n clearly appear upon the face of the statute, su.pra, and 
that similar cla.ssification of persons and subjects for the pur-
poses of taxation have been held by this court valid and 
proper, see Bradley· vs. Richmond, supra; Insurance Co. vs. 
Winchester, 110 Va. 451, 66 s .. E. 84; Woodall vs. Lynchbu'l'g, 
100 Va. 318, 40 S. E. 915; Ould vs. Richmond, 23 Gratt. ( 64 y a.) 464; Eyre vs. Ja-cobs, suzJra .. " 
In the case of Hart, et al., vs. Board of Com'rs. of Burke 
County, ·et al., 134 S. E. (N. ·C.) 403, the court ·said, (p. 405): 
"'It has been said that perfect uniformity and perfect 
equality of taxation, in all the aspects in which the human 
mind can view it, is a baseless dream. * * * With reference 
to locality, a tax is uniform when it operates with equal 
force and effect in every place where the subject of it is 
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found, * * * is uniform when it bperates without distinction 
or discrimination upon all perso~s composing the describeq 
class.' R. R. vs. L.ac.11, 187 N. ·C. 1~615, 122 S. E. 763; Edye vs. Robertson, 112 U. S. 580,~5 S·. Ct ~ 247, 28 L. F~. 798; Cooley 
on Taxation, c. 6; Lacy vs. PMk~ng Co., 134 N. C. 567, 47 S. 
E. 53; State vs. l)_enson, 189 N. C. 173, 126 S. E. 517." 
· Only recently this Court held ~alid a law imposing in addi-
tion to regular merchants' licenses, a license tax for operation 
by a merchant of a distributing house in Com. vs. Bibee Gro-
cery Co., 153 Va. 935. In his opirtion, Justice Campbell stated 
(p. 940): I 
I 
"It is the contention of defendant that the classification is 
unreasonable, for the reason that! a special class of merchants 
is created and the effect of the statute is to impose an addi-
tional tax on an instrumentality
1 
of the business. With this 
contention we are unable to concur. It was competent for the 
Legislature to place merchants operating a distributing house 
in a different classification from 1 those merely conducting re-
tail stores. There is nothing in !the record to show that the 
maintenance of a distributing house is a necessary incident 
to the business of operating several retail stores. It is un-
questionably true that the maintenance and operation of a 
large distributing house in addition to operating seven retail 
stores imposes upon the commonwealth and the cities thereof 
a greater burden in fulfilling their obligations of protecting 
property rights, maintaining streets and highways, as well as 
furnishing sewer and other sanitary conveniences.'' 
. So, too, in McKenny vs. City' Council of .Ale~ria, 147 
Va. 157, this Court held valid a license for each discharge 
standard at a filling station in addition to the regular mer-
chant's license. 
· The complainant contends that the Act is unconstitutional 
in that it is lacking in uniformity and denies equal protec-
tion of the la,vs to persons within the jurisdiction of the -State 
because the Act classifies the subjects who must pay the tax 
to be every fire and lightning insurance company, corporation 
or association, but excludes mutual or co-operative fire and 
lightning insurance companies, operating on the assessment 
plan and not for profit. We submit the only question which 
may be raised in this respect is whether or not the classifica-
tion thus made by the General Assembly is arbitrary and un-
reasonable. If not, according to the great weight of authority, 
the said Act does not violate the State Constitution in this 
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respect'. It is a .. matter of public knowledge that associations 
operating under a n1utual or co-operative plan and not for 
profit conduct their busin~ss in an entirely different manner 
from those companies which have invested capital and oper-
ate for the purpose of making a profitable return to the in-
vestors. The Legislature of this and other States have al-
ways recognized this distinctive classification with regard 
to mutual insurance companies, mutual building and loan as-
sociations and similar businesses. Section 240 of the Tax 
Code of Virg·inia exempts certain mutual fire associations 
from all but a nominal tax. Section 4326t of the Virginia 
Code exempts mutual insurance companies organized in or 
admitted to this State from all fees, licenses and taxes, Slate, 
county and municipal, except certain nominal taxes therein 
mentioned. We submit that the classification contained iu 
the .Act under attack is not only a. reasonable classification, 
but is one which for years has been so recognized. 
(h) The complainant contend.r;; that the said act violate.~ 
Section 1 of Article XITT of the An~endntm~ts of the Oonstit'l.t.:. 
tion .of the United Bta.tes which 1Jrwo·ides in pa1·t that no Statl~ 
shall- make or enforce o;ny law which shall abridge the privi-
le.qes or immunities of citize1M of the United States; that no 
Sta{e shall deprive cvny pet·son of life, liberty or property 
witho~tt due process of law; ancl that no Sta.te shall deny to 
any pe1·son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
Section 1 of Article XIV of the Amendments of the Con-
stitution of the United States provides in part as follows= 
''No State shall make or enforce any laws which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty 
or property, 'vithout due process of la,v; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protectiou of the 
laws.'' 
Section 11 of the Constitution of ·virginia. provides in part 
as follows : . . 
'·'That no person shall be deprived of his property without 
due process of law." 
The con1plainant 's contention that the Act violates S:ection 
1 of Article XIV of the Amendments of the Constitution o( 
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the United States was ·passed upon in the cas·e of People vs. 
Fire Assn. of Philadelphia., 92 N.Y. 311, and affirmed by the 
United States Supreme Court in 119 U. S. 110. The aet pro-· 
vided that an insurance company bf another State seeking to· 
do business in New York should I pay to the Superi~tenden~.­
of Insurance for taxes, etc., a.n amount equal to that Imposed 
by the existing or future law·s of fthe State of its origin. At 
page 324 the court said: 
''The second objection to the constitutionality of the act 
is founded upon Article 14 ·of the Federal·Constitution, and 
especially upon its vital clause which commands that no State 
shall 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the la,vs'. ·The argument- here takes a wide· 
range and touches upon question!' of supreme and vital im-
portance as to the relations of the States to each other, and 
of each to. the United States. Corporations are claimed to 
be ~pers·ons' within the meaning ~nd protection ·of the clause 
referred to; its force and opera:tion is carried beyond the 
limit indicated by the emergency 1from which it sprang; a.nd 
it is asserted to forbid unequal taxation a.nd condemn such 
legislation as that under consideration.· But we think these 
grave questions are not before us and the clause relied upon 
has no application to the right ofi the court. It is a corpora-
tion, organized and existing under the laws of Pennsylvania:; 
a creature of those laws, and beyond their jurisdiction, car.,.· 
rying its corporate life and existence only by sufferance 
and upon au express or implied consent. It could not come 
within our jurisdiction, or trans·act business within our ter-
ritory except by our permission,! either ·express or implied. 
*...,*The situation then is this: Thb State, having the power to 
exclude foreign corporations, det~rmines to do so unless they 
will submit to certain conditions. i * * * 'Vhen the corporation 
comes in it agrees to the conditions. They become binding 
by its assent. The tax or license fee charged by the act of 
186~ is one of these conditions.'' 
The Virginia case of BradleJJ vs. City of Richmond, 110 
va. 521, S~tpra, was affirmed by the United States Supreme 
Court in 227 U. S. 477, where the i court said (p. 481): 
. "But when the matters concerhs the determination of the 
business or occupation which 1n.ay be required to take out a 
l-icense and pay a tax as a condition of obtaining such a li"" 
cense, the power of the State is scibject to no limitations, save 
those found in t;he guarantee of i due process and th'e equal 
I 
I 
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protection o'f the law. Iri the present. instance, the State has 
delegated this power of selecting the businesses and oceupa-. 
tions carried on with the city of Richmond, and of dividing 
them into classes and determining the amount of the tax to 
be paid by the members of each class. The State Supreme· 
Court has decided that there can be no objection under the 
Constitution of the State to such delegation. Neither do we. 
see any reason under the Fourteenth Amendment why the. 
State may not delegate to either the council of the city or to 
a board appointed for that purpose the power to divide sucl1. 
occupations or privileges into classes or sub-classes, and pre-
scribe the tax to be paid by the members of each such class. 
Gundling vs. Chica,qo, 177 U . .S. 183; Fischer vs. St. Louis, 194 
U.S. 361, 372; Lieberma;n vs. Va.n De Carr, 199U. S. 552,560. 
"Finally, the plaintiff in error say~ that the actual opera;. 
tion of the ordinance has brought about an unjust a.nd illegal 
discrimination in that he has been classified in such manner 
as to subject him and his business to a. higher tax, as a con-
dition of issuing to him a license, then that required of many 
other private bankers. This was a defense made in the state 
court. But that court, after sa.ying that it was competent for. 
the council to assign private bankers to different classes, and 
that the plaintiff in error has been required to pay no· 
greater license tax than all others in the same class, said : 
- " 'In order to render the classification illegal, the party as-
sailing it must show that the business discriminated against 
is precisely the same as that included in the class which is 
alleged to be favored. Norfolk, &c., ''s. Norfolk, 105 Vir-
ginia 139. That has not been shown in the present case; on 
the contrary, it appears that the business of the plaintiff in 
error is no precisely the same with that of other private bank-
ers who are put in a different class and assessed with a leRs 
license tax.' 
''That some private bankers were put into classes which sub-
jected them to less taxation than the class into which the 
plaintiff in error was placed is the only allegation which would 
tend to show discrimination. But there was evidence ·tend-
ing to show tha.t the business done by the plaintiff in erroi·' 
and ten other persons or firms was that of lending money 
at high rates upon salaries and household furniture, while 
the kind of business done by others in the same general busi-
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ness- was the lending of money hpon coinmercial securities. 
Obviously the burden was upon the plaintiff in error to show 
an illegal a.nd capricious elassifichtion. The state court said 
that.he had failed to show that tHese pri:vate bankers favored 
in the classification were doing the same business. • 
"In Ho·me Telephone Company vs. Los Angeles, 211 U.S. 
265, 280, 281, the complaint was that the city, under an au-
thority to regulate the chargesj: for telephone service, ha.d 
given a more favorable rate to a rival company and had 
thereby illegally discriminated. After saying that the alle-
gation of such difference was 't .o vague to pass upon', this 
court said: · 
'''Whether the two companies, operated in the same terri-
tory, or afforded equal facilities: for communication, or ren-
dered the same services does nat appear. For aught that 
appears, the other company ma.y hav-e brought its patrons 
into communication with a. very ~uch larger number of per-
sons, dwelling in a Il)uch more wi~ely extended territory, and 
t·endered very much more valuable services. In other words, 
a just ground for -classification m~y have existed. Every pre-
sumption should be indulged in favor of the constitutionality 
?f the legislation. ' 
· "See ·also Sweet vs. Rechel, 15r u. s. 380, 392." 
We submit without further citation of au.thority that the 
Act does not violate Section 1 of I Article XIV of the Amend-
ments of the Constitution of the: United States. 
CONCLUSION. 
From this it will. plainly appbar that the A.et of Mareh 
31st, 1932, does not violate any [of the sections of the ·Con-
stitution of Virginia or the Federal Constitution .. The fire-
men of Virginia are engaged in the discharge of public func-
tions for which the State is primarily liable to its citizens. 
They are public officers, though appointed and under the po-
litical sub-divisions where their :services are performed. 
The Act in question does not constitute charity. It is sus-
. tainable· on the ground that the akounts to be received there-
under ·by the beneficiaries of the Act are compensation and 
also upon the ground that in the 1exercise of its inherent sov-
ereignty the State may impose such tax for the purpose of 
this Aet under its police power. 
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J:l,inally, we direct the attention of this Court. to the very·. 
strong presumption 0~ law in favor of the constitutionality 
of an act of the Legislature, ·as was said by the Supreme_ 
Court of this State in the case of Shena;ndoah Lime Co. vs. 
Governor, 115 Va. 8~5: 
''The principles by which this court is governed in con-: 
sidering the constitutionality of a law have been too fre-
quently the subject of judicial decision to require the cita-
tion of authority. Every presumption is made in favor of 
the constitution~tlity of_ an act of the legislature. A reason-· 
able doubt as to its constitutionality must be solved in favor-
of the validity of_the law, and. the courts have nothing to do 
With the question whether or not the _legislation is wise and .. 
proper, as the ·legislature has plenary po-wer, except 'vhere 
the Constitution of the State or of the United States forbids; 
and it is only in cases where the statute in question is plainly: 
repugnant to some provision of the Con.Stit:ution that the 
courts can declare it to be null and void.'' · 
WHEREFORE7 your petitioners pray that they be granted; 
im appeal from the said decree of the Circuit Court of th~ 
City of Richmond declaring Chapter 414 of the Acts of the 
General Assembly of Virginia for the year 1932 to the uncon-
stitutional, that said ·Chapter be declared to be· constitutional 
and that the decree of the trial court ordering a refund to 
the National Fire Insurance Company of Hartford be set 
. ~side, and th~ st.Iit dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
C01Yil\IONWEALTH OF VIkGINIA, 
JOHN ~I. PURCELL, State Treasurer, and. 
E. · R. COMBS' Comptroller. 
By JNO. R. SAUNDERS, Atty. General." 
COLLINS DENNY, JR., 
Assistant Attorney-General of Virginia. 
VIRGINIA STATE FIREME·N'S ASSOCIATION 
AND STATE FIRE CHIEE1S' ASSOCIATION, 
By W ALI-AERSTEIN, GOODE & EVANS, ·Counsel. 
An~icu.s Curiae. . 
I, Mo,rton L. vVallerstein, an attorney practicing in the S'n-
preme Court of Appeals of Virginia, do hereby. certify that: 
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in my opinion the foregoing petition should b~ reviewJd, set 
aside and annulled and the suit should be dismissed. ~ 
Given under my hand this 8th day of September, i933. 
MORr.L'ON L. WALLERSTEIN. 
Received Sept. 11, 1933. 
j M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
. I 
Sept. 26, 1933. Appeal award
1
ed by the Cou_rt. No bond! 
I 
Received Sept. 29, 1933. i 
· M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
RECORD 
VIRGINIA.: 
Pleas before the Circuit Court of the City of Rich-· 
mond, held in the Court Room of said City in the City Hall 
thereof on ~Ionday, the 17th ~ay of July, 1933._ · . - . 
Be it remembered th~t heretbfore to-wit: at rules held 
in the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of the City of Rich~ 
mond, on the third Monday in M~y,_1933, came National Fh··e 
Insurance Company of Hartford, by its attorneys, and filed 
its bill and exhibits against the :commonwealth of Virginia, 
.Auditor of Public Accounts of the Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia, John 1\I. Purcell, State TI"easurer and E. R. Combs, 
Comptroller, which bill and exhibits are in the words and 
figures as follows to-wit: 
National Fire Insurance CompaJ;ty of Hartford 
vs. 
The Commonwealth of Virg·inia~ L. McCarthy Downs, Au-
.ditor of Public Accounts of ~he Commonwealth of Vir-
.. gi~ia, John 1\L Purcell, State Treasurer, and E. R. Gombs, 
Comptroller. ] · f · 
To the Honorable Julian Gunn, Judge of said Con t: 
. I 
Your complainant, National lfire Insurance Company of 
Hartford, a corporation, humbly complaining, show~ unto 
vour I-Ionor: 1 j 
~age 2 } (1) That it is a fire and lightning insuranc~ com-
pany and a corporation engaged in the busixless of 
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~ffecting insurance against the risks of loss and ·damage· by 
fire and lightning and that it does business in certain cities, 
towns and counties in the Sta.te of Virginia, .. which have regu-
larly organized fire departments under the control of the 
Mayor, City Council or other governing bodies of such cities, 
towns or counties. ; . 
(.2) That it is not a. mutual or co-operative fire or lightning 
insurance company, operating on the assessment plan and not 
for -profit. . 
(3) Tha.t acting under the supposed authority of an Act 
of the General Assembly of Virginia, approved March · 31, 
1932, the same being Chapter 414 of the Acts of the General 
Assembly of Virginia. for the year 1932, the Commissioner of 
Insurance and Banking of the Commonwealth of Virginia, 
a resident of the City of Richmond,· in the Sta.te of Virginia, 
or someone acting for him or on his behalf, furnished to 
your complainant a form upon which your complainant was 
required to make. return to the Commissioner of Insurance 
and Banking of the Commonwealth of Virginia of the gross 
amount of all premiums ·collected or received by it, without 
any deduction for losses, dividend~, commissions or other 
expenses, from the 2tst day of J nne, 1932, to the 31st day of 
December, 1932, both inclusive, from its fire and lightning 
business within the limits of certain cities, towns, counties 
or magisterial districts within the State of Virginia, shown 
on said form, a copy of which form, with the blanks 
page 3 ~ therein, is hereto attached, marked Exhibit A and 
. made a part of this bill. And your complainant· 
accordingly, on or about the 27th day of February, in the 
year 1933, returned to· the Commissioner of Insurance and 
Banking an account of such premiums so collected and re-
ceived. 
(4) That the said Commissioner of Insurance and Banking; 
fr~m the returns made by your complainant and other fire 
and lightning insurance companies, corporation or associa-
tions of like nature, acting further under such ·supposed 
authority,. prepared a statement showing separately . the 
amounts to be paid by your complainant and· by such other 
companies, corporations and associatio~s on account of th~ 
fire and lightning business transacted in each such city, town 
or county, and certified the said statement to the Auditor of 
Public Accounts and to the Treasurer of Virginia. -
( 5) That your complainant was thereupon, u~der the ~up­
posed authority of the said act, assessed with the sum of 
One Hundred and Eighty Dollars a.nd Seventy-Eight Cents 
'($180.781, as a tax, based upon the premiums collected by 
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it from its fire and .lighting insurance business done within 
the limits of certain cit~es~ town~~ counties and magisterial 
districts shown on said form, . at: the rate of fifty cents out 
of and from every hundred dollars of such premiums re-
ceived by it during such period, and was required to deliver 
a.nd pay to the Treasurer of Virg~nia t~e-said sum of $180:78 
hi addition to all other taxes required- by law to 
page 4 ~ be paid by it, and the ~aid sum of $180.78 was de-
livered and paid by your complainant to t4e ~reas­
urer of Virginia on the 5th daYi of April, 1933, but under 
protest, your. complainant having as~erted ··the· unconstitu-
tionality and the invalidity of the ~aid Act of the General 
Assembly of Virginia under which the said assessment was 
made and the said tax was imposed. 
- . (6) That the said Act of the General f\.ssembly of Virginia, 
referred to above, further provid~s that any fire or lightning-
insurance. company, such as yo~ complainant, which shall 
knowingly or. wilfully fail or negl~_ct to report or to pay over 
any money due on premiums as ~oresaid at the time and iii 
the manner specified in the Act, or which shall be found upon 
examination to have made a fal~e return on business done, 
shall . for each offense be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor 
and, moreover; that if any such company shall fail to make 
·payment into the Treasury of the Commonwealth of Virginia 
at the times and in the manner spe_cified in the _Act, the amount 
found due by such company may be recovered by action 
brought in this C~urt, after ten 1 days' notice on motion of 
the Commissioner of Insurance and Banking and in his name 
for the benefit of the relief fund ~rovided for in the said Act. 
Moreover, your complainant, haa it failed to comply with 
the requirements of the said supposed Act, might have bee;n 
subjected to the penalties prescriped by Sections 4180, 4181, 
4210, 4177, 4203 and· 3848 of the Code of Virginia. 
( 7) And your complainant further alleges that the said 
Act of the General Assembly of Virginia is unconstitutional 
and wholly void and is of no effect whatever; that 
page 5 } it is in conflict with the' provisions of the Constitu-
tions, both of the State of Virginia and of the United 
States, a.nd that no duties nor liabilities are imposed upon 
the said Commissioner of Insurance and Banking or upon the 
said Treasurer or upon any other official or upon your com-
plainant or any other company bf like nature by anything 
in said Act contained. And in support of this allegation your 
complainant further says : ! 
(a) That the said act is indefinit'e and uncertain in its terms, 
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designated -as the Firemen~s Relief Fund and the purposes 
for which i_t is to be disbursed_ by the trustees . 
. (b) That the :~aid act is in violation of Section 52 of the 
C~nstitution o{ Virginia which is, in part, as follows: 
''No la\v: shall embrace more. than one object which. shall 
be expre~sed i:n its title.'' 
_The object of the act in question, as expressed in.its title 
is _''To levy· a tax upon. the premiums collected by ·all fire 
and ligh~ning insurance compani~s doing business in t~i~ 
StateP for the pnrpose of creat1ng a ·fund for the rehef 
of injured and disabled firemen and for the relief of the 
dependents of deceased firemen. The act itself expressly ex~ 
eludes from its operation a class of fire and lightning in-
surance companies doing business in this State, to-wit: 
"Mutual or cooperative fire and lightning insur~nce com.:. 
panies, operating on the assessment plan and· not 
page 6 } for· profit." 1\IIoreover, the said act in the 7th para.,.. 
· ·graph thereof provides that the fund shall be dis~ 
bursed for the relief ·of injured and disabled member~ of 
any fire department ·of any such city, town or county, re-
ferring to cities; towns and counties which have regularly 
organized fire departments under the control of the Mayor, 
City Council or other governing bo~ies of such cities, towns 
or· counties and for the relief- of those actually dependent 
upon the services of any firemen who has lost his life in the 
fire se-rvice·of such ·cities, towns or counties, and for the pay..: 
;m.ent of the n~cessary funeral expenses of any member of 
such fire department. 
(c) TlJ.at the act contravenes Section 67 of the Constitu .. 
tion of Virginia which prohibits the General Assembly from 
making appropriation of public funds to any charitable insti-
tution. which is not owned or controlled by the State, except 
appropriations to non-sectarian institutions for the reform 
of youthful criminals. The funds so acquired and accrued 
are, under the provisions of the act, to be paid over to the 
trustees to be appointed as provided in the act .,, upon ap-
propriations to be made from time to time by the General As-
sembly of Virginia'', from funds accruing under the pro.:. 
visions of the act. The trustees receive and disburse, in 
their judgment and discretion, within the territory served 
by their r€spective organizations, the portion of the fund 
created by the act and apportioned to them; respectively, 
· for the purposes set out in the-- ttct. But neithe,~ 
page 7 ~ the fire companies nor the ·paid fire departments 
nor the paid members of such fire departments nor 
I 
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the trustees elected by such fire ompanies nor the members 
of such fire· companies are owne or controlled by the State 
of Virginia, while the funds to e so appropriated are for 
charitable purposes. 
(d) That the Act approved M. rch 21, 19321 and referred 
to abo~e, contravenes Section 188 of the Constitution of 
Virginia, which is as follows : I 
''No other or greater amount of tax or revenue shall, at 
any time, be levied than may be !required for the necessary 
expenses o£ the Government or o pay the indebtedness or 
the State." 
The amount of money which your complainant was re-
quired to pay under the act and ~which is therein designated 
as a tax is not required ~or the necessary expenses of the 
State Government nor is it requifd to pay any indebtedness 
of the State, The General Assem ly,, theref.ore, had no right· 
to levy the same. The fire com antes and the fire ·depart~ 
:ments mentioned in the act are not. governmental agencies 
of the State. Nor are the membe s of such :fire companies ol' 
fire departments employees of t , e State. The expenses of 
maintaining such companies or departments is not a neces-
sary expense of the State. The ct itself contemplates that 
the fire companies or :fire depa tments shall be under the 
control of the Mayor, City Coun il or other governing body· 
of the city, town or county or gisterial district. Section 
120 of the Oonstittttion of Virgi ia places the members of 
fire departments within cities un er the control of the Mayvr 
of such cities. Parag ph 4 of the act refers to 
page 8 ~ :fire companies orga.niz~d under the provisions of 
Chapter 125 of the Cocle of Virginia, in cities and 
towns, which are under the control of the ·councils of such 
cities or towns, and to paid :fire drartments in any such city.;. 
town or county, and such :fire. co panies and the ·paid mem~ 
hers of such fire departments ar the only organizations or 
bodies which are authorized to e ect the trustees who are to 
receive and disburse, within th territory served by their 
respective organizations, the funds appropriated for the re-· 
lief of injured and disabled memb~rs of such fire department!-i 
or for the relief of those actually ependent upon the services 
'·.of any firemen who has lost hi life in the :fire service of 
any. city, town or county, or fo the payment of necessary 
funeral expenses of any membe of such fire department 
Nor are the appropriations to be made under the provisions 
of this act appropriations for a. y public purpose, but for 
benevolent purposes only. If the councils or other govern-
! 
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ing bodies of the cities of the first class within the State of 
Virginia d~m it desirable to establish a system of pensions 
for injured, retired or superannuated members of the fire 
department of such cities or desire to .appropriate money 
out of the public funds of such- cit.ies to .aid in .the support 
of dependent .children. of· membe-rs- of the Aire 4 .department~ 
of such cities who have lost th~ir .lives .through injuries re-
ceived or illness incurred while- in the performances of -thei: 
duties as members . of .. such fire departments, they may do 
so under the provisions of Sections 3035 and 3035-A of the 
. -·· Code of Virginia. But the State of Vi:rginia has 
page. 9 r no right to levy any tax for such purpose. . " 
(e) The. Act in question contravenes Section 185 
of. the Constitution of Virginia which provides .in part that 
neither the credit of the State, nor of the cou.nty, city or. 
town, . ..shall be directly or indirectly, under any devic.e or pre ... 
tense --wh.atsoe~r, granted to or in aid of any person, asso-. 
ciation .or corporation, and that the State shall, not assume 
any indebtedness of any county, city or town nor lend its· 
credit to the same. 1.: 
.. (f~- T~. said. ac.t con~.ra.ve!les Section 63 of the C.onstitutio.n 
of Virgtnia-which-provides-In part that the General Assembly 
of Yirginia shall not enact any local, special or private law~ 
for the assessment and collection of taxes, with an exceptio 
not pertinent here, granting from the Treasury of the State, 
or granting or authorizing to be granted from the Treasury 
of any policical sub-division thereof, any extra compen~ation 
to any public officer, servant, agent or contractor; granting 
any pension; or~:granting to any private corporation, asso-
ciation or individual ari.y special or exclusive right or im::· 
munity. ·.· · 
:'(g) The said acf contravenes Section 168 of the Constituti<>n 
of Virginia which provides in part that all taxes, whet~er 
State, local or municipal, shall be uniform upon the same· 
class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority 
levying~ the· tax and shall be levied and collected under gen-
eral law. Your complainant was required by the provisions 
of tlie· act to ·deliver and to pay to the Treasurer of Virginia 
( · · · the sum of fifty cents out of and from every hun~. 
page 10 ~ dred -dollars of premiums received by it, during 
tlie· petiod ·mentioned, on policies covering prop~, 
erty situated within the limits of the cities, towns and coun,... 
ties of the ·class" referred to. The fire companies and the' 
fire d~pa.rtmenis :r-eferred to in the act, or ·the members there-
of, are not required to perform any special duty or service for 
yo_u:r ~ complaiman.t ror f@r any other fire or lightning insur-
,. . .. -.. 
,. 
~. . . 
•' 
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ance companies of like nature which they do riot owe to the' 
general public or to other fire and lightning ins11rance com-
panies. The beneficiaries of. the provisions of the act for, 
some years to come would· be to a large extent ·those who 
had been injured or disabled before the act became effective, 
or the dependents of those who had died before the_act be-
came effective, if the act should be held to be valid. More-
over, in each of such cities, towns or counties referred to in 
the act a portion of the property subject-to the risk of dam-· 
age by fire or lightning is not insured against such risk or 
not fully insured against the same, and the owners of such 
property, who receive the same benefit from the services of 
the fire companies or the fire departments or the memoers 
thereof as does your complainant, are not required to pay any 
amount for the purposes for which the alleged tax imposed 
upon your. complainant was levied, or are required to- pay, 
where .the property is not fully ins~red, an amount less than 
that imposed upon your complainant. :A portion of. the prop-
erty in . ..such cities, towns and counties is insured ~Y fire· and 
light~g insurance companies which do-., not ~ome within 
. · . the provisions of the act, but which receive the· 
page ·11 } benefit from the se-rvices of the fire ~orn.pan1es . or· 
the fire departments ·or ·the members thereof as 
d'oes' your complainant, and such companies are not required 
to pay any portion of the premiums or assessments receive·d 
by them on policies covering property situated within the 
limits of such cities, towns and counties. The act is an at-
t~mpt to· levy a tax upon a special class of fire and lightninp; 
Insurance companies within the general classification of fire 
~nd li~htning insurance companies, for the benefit of a class 
o·f citizens, where none of the classifications rest upon any 
proper or reasonable distinction, and if your complainant 
and the other insurance companies of like nature were per-
mitted to pass the burden of the so-called tax on to the 
owners of the properties within such cities, towns or coun-
ties whose properties a.re insured, such owners would be re-
quired to pay a tax which would not be imposed upon the 
owners of uninsured property and a larger tax than that 
which would be imposed upon the owners of property which 
'vas partially insured. · 
(h) That the said act violates Section-1 of Article XIV 
of the Amendments of the Constitution of the United States 
which provide.s in part that no State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; that no State shall depriv~ 
any person of life, liberty or property without due process 
. - . 
, - .. ~ . 
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of law; and that no State. shall deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. The act 
in question is not a proper exercise of the taxing power of 
the State. . The imposition upon your complain-
page 12 ~ ant of the duty of cqntributing to the relief of 
inju~ed. ~nd CU.s.abled members of any :fire depart-
ment of cities,, towns and ~ounties of the class referred to 
and to the relief of those actually dependent upon the services 
of any fireman who has lost his life in the fire service of 
any sucii city, town or county or to the payment of the neces-
sary funeral expenses of any member of such fire department 
is the taking of your complainant's money and paying it to 
others and depriving your complainant of its property with-
out due process of la,v, in contra\'ention of this section of 
the Federal Constitution as well as in contravention of Sec-
tion 11 of the Constitution of Virginia.. Moreover, the at-
~empted classification of :fire and lightning insurance com-
panies into mutual or cooperati\'e fire and lightning insurance 
companies operating on the assessment plan ·and not for 
profit, and other fire and lightning insurance companies, for 
the purposes ·of an attempt at taxation, does not rest upon 
~ny reasonable distinction and the effect of this is to deny 
to your complainant . the equal protection of the laws of 
the State. Moreover, the exemption of such mutual or co-
operative :fire and lightning insurance companies from the 
operation of the act is a violation of Section 64 of the Con-
stitution of Virginia. Moreover, the exemption of the owners 
of property within such cities, towns and counties which is 
not insl.1red, and the imposition of a lesser burden upon the 
property only partially insured, likewise denies to your com-
plainant 'the . equal protection of the laws of the State of 
Virginia. 
page 13 } (8) Your complainant further aUeges that your 
complainant is aggrieved by the said assessment 
and by the collection of the said sum of $180.78 which is desig-
nated· a tax and that it has a claim against the Common-
wealth of Virginia. for the repayment and refund of the. 
amount so paid to the St~te Treasurer "q.nder the provisions 
of the said Act of the General Assembly of ·Virginia. Your 
complainant. has presented its s~id claim· to the Auditor of 
Public Accounts of the State of Virginia: fot: payment~ nud 
.the. same was by the said Auditor referred to E. R. Combs,. 
Comptroller, who, under tbe Reorganization Act of 1927, was 
required to exercise and perform an· the powers theretofore 
confe1·red and all the duties theretofore imposed by law upou 
th~ Auditor of Public Accounts. And the ·said ·Comptroller. 
--------- ----~-------
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has advised the attorneys for your complainant that he could 
only make such refund on an order from your Honor's Court. 
( 9) That the said Act of the General Assembly of Virginia 
further provides- that the amount so paid by the companies, 
corporations and associations, including your complainant, 
shall constitute a fund to be designated as the Firemen's 
Relief Fund and used for disabled firemen and for the re-
lief of widows and dependent children of deceased firemen 
as in said act provied for, and that the funds so acquired 
and accrued shall ba used for no other purpose, and that 
they shall be paid over to the trustees provided for. in said 
act for such relief, to be appointed for e·ach city, t.own and 
county of the State, as in said act set out, upon appro-
priation to be made from time to time by the General Assem-
bly of Virginia, from funds accruing under the pro-
page 14 ~ visions of the said act; and the Treasurer of Vir-
ginia is required to make report to each regular 
$essio-n of the General.Assembly, showing the amount of such 
funds in his hands as of the 1st day of January of the year 
in which such session is held. 
(10) Your complainant further alleges that the said sum 
of $180.78 constitutes a part of the so-called Firemen's Re-
lief Fund; that it was illegally levied, assessed and collected; 
that it did not pass into the State Treasury, although it is 
held by the State Treasurer in a separate account; that it is 
sought to be made- a trust fund for beneficiaries of" a certain 
class; that it cannot be used for the purposes set out in said 
act; that the beneficiaries thereof as provided for in the said 
act have no interest in the said fund nor any rights thereto; 
that a.ny attempt on the part of the General Assembly of 
Virginia to appropriate any part of the said fund to the 
trustees provided for in the said act or for their use would 
be wholly void and of no effect; that the. said fund cannot be 
used for any other purpose; and that the State Treasurer, 
in wh6se custody the sa.id sum of $180.78 is, should be re-
quired_ to refund and repay the same to your complainant . 
. · IN TENDER CONSIDERATION WHEREOF and for as 
n1uch as your complainant is without remedy in the premises 
save by the aid of this honorable Court of Chancery, wherein 
matters of this kind are alone and properly cognizable, your 
complainant prays that the Commonwealth of Virginia, L. 
. McCarthy Downs, AtJditor of Public Accounts of 
page 15 } the Commonwealth of Virginia, John M. Purcell, 
· State ·Treasurer, and E. R. Combs, Comptroller, 
may be ~ade parties defendant to this bill and required to 
o6 Supreme Court of .Appeals C?f.-Virginia .. 
answer the same, answers under oath being waived; .that 
this Court may pass upon the constitutionality, the validity 
and the binding effect of the said act of the General Assem-
bly of Virginia approved March 31, 1932; that this Court 
may declare the said act unconstitutional, invalid and of no 
binding effect; that this Court may establish your complain"" 
ant's claim and award a decree in favor of your complainant, 
directing the payment to your complainant of the said sum 
of $180~78, and that John M. Purcell, State Treasurer, may 
be required to repay and to refund to your complainant . the 
said sum of $180.78 paid to him by your complainant as 
herein set forth; that a warrant therefor may be issued by 
the Comptroller; and that your complainant may have all 
such other and further and general relief in the premises 
as to which it may be· entitled. 
- And your complainant will ever pray, etc. 
NATIONAL FffiE INSURANCE COMPANY 
OF HARTFORD, 
By J. GORDON BOHANNAN, . 
Attorney. 
I i . ! . : 
StatP. of Virginia, 
·ii • I • 
'; o ,I •I I • '• t 
. City of Petersburg, To-wit: 
I, Virginia E. Fischer, a Notary Public' in and for the Citv 
aforesaid, in the State of Virginia, do hereby certify that J. 
Gordon Bohannan, whose·name is signed to the foregoing bill 
in Chancery as attorney for the complainant named therein~ 
personally appeared before me in my City afore-
pag~ 16} said and made oath that the matters and things 
· set out in said bill are true. 
· Given unrler my hand this 4th day of May, in the year 
1933 .. 
VIRGINIA E. FISCHER, 
Notary Public. 
I~fPORT.ANT.-This Report MUST BE FILED with the 
COM~!ISSIONER OF INSURANCE AND BANKING not 
later than March 1st. · 
REPORT OF FIRE AND LIGHTNING PREMIUMS RE-
CEIVED BY INSURANCE COMPANIES. 
Report of the gross amount of all premiums collected or . 
received, without any deduction for losses, dividends, com-
~------------:----- ------------ ---
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. missions or other expenses (premiums returned on~ cancelled 
policies may be deducted) ! · 
by the Insurance Com-
pany, from the 21st day of June, 1932, to the. 31st· day., of 
December, 1932, both inclusive, from its fire and lightning 
business within the limits of each of the following. cities, 
towns, counties or magisterial districts within the: State. of 
Virginia: 
.. 
City, Town, County or % of 1% of 








8 .. Bedford 
9. Berkley 
10. Berryville 








page 17 } 19. Bristol 
20. Buchanan 
21. Buena Vista 
22. Cape. Charles 
23. Charlottesville 






30. Clifton Forge 
31. Coeburn 
32. Colonial Beach 






... , .. 
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:: 3.7; .. 0\ll.p~per . 
38. Danville 




· 43. Ettrick$ . . . . , 
44. Fairfax C. H. 
45. Falls Church 




50. Front Royal 
51. Galax 




56. Hilton Village 
57. Hopewell 












page 18 ~ 70. Narrows 
71. New Market 













(' .. , ...... . 
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~7i· Quantico . 
85. Radford . 
86. Richlands 
·s7. ·Richmond . . ...... . 
~8 •. Roanoke .... : . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 
·89. Rocky Mount ..... . 
~0. Round Hill · 
91. Rural Retreat 
~~:·~~e~ul 
94. Saltville·-.... ----- -- --
95: Sandston . 
96. Scottsville 
97. Shenandoah ............... , . . 
98. Smithfield .... , 
· 99. South Boston 
100. South Hill 
J,.01. Staunton 
102. Strasburg 





108. Virginia Beach 
109. Wakefield' · 
110. Warrenton 
lll:_ WaynesbOro· · · . 
112. West Po'int 
113. Williamsburg 
114: Winchester ( 
i15 .. Wise. . 
116. Woodstock 
117. Wytheville 
118. Arlington County . 
(outside Alexandria). 
· · .. . · 119 .. Elizabeth City Oounty 
page 19 ~ (outside Hampton and 
Phoebus) 
120. Henrico· County · · · · 





. . ' . 
Secretary of Chief Accounting Officer. 
---.-- -Supreme Court of Appeal~· of Virginia.--~ 
'State of ........•... , 
City of .......... , To-Wit: 
) . 
. ·'' 
This day ........................ -. . Secretary or Chief 
Accounting officer of the ................................ . 
Insurance Company of the City of ...... .'. :. . . . personally 
appeared befor~ me in the city aforesaid, and made oath 
to the corr~ctness of the foregoing report~ _ 
Given under my hand this . . . . . . . . . . day of ••....... ~ 
19 ..• 
' Notary Public. 
My commission expires .................... . 
.j 
And at another day to-wit: 
Virginia: 
In the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of the City. of. 
Richmond, on Monday, the 17th day of July, 1933, the follow-
ing demurrer was received and filed: 
page 20 ~ DEMURRER. 
-,_ 
National Fire Insurance- Company of Hartford 
vs. 
The Commonwealth of Virginia, John M. Purcell, ·state Treas-
urer, and E. R. Combs, Comptroller. 
The said defendants say that th~ bill of complaint in this -
suit is not sufficient in law, and state the ground of demurrer: 
relied on to be as follows: 
(1) That the Act of the General Assembly of Virginia, ap-
proved March 31st, 1932, is in all respects a valid enactment 
and is not contrary to the provisions of the State.or Federal 
Constitution. . - · -
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, . 
JOHN M. PURCJPLL, State Treasurer, and 
E. R. COMBS, Comptroller. 
COLLINS DENNY, JR., 
Assi,stant .. Attorney .. Ge.neral. 
By CounseL 
---- -- ~~----- ·---
Commoli~eattli, 'etc~~;v~'Nat~ Fir~lTiJS:~ guroi.Hartforcl. f.i 
And on the sai;ne day· to-wit: 
Virginia: 
. In the Circui~ Court qf Jhe City of Richmond, the follow-
ing d~cre_e was enter:ed whi_ch is in the words and figures 
followtng: -· 
page 21 ~ DECREE. 
National Fire Insurance Company of Hartford 
vs. 
The Commonwealth of_ Virginia, L. McCarthy Downs, Audi-
. tor of Public Accounts of the Commonwealth of Virginia, . 
John M. Purcell, State Tr~asurer, and E. R. Combs, Comp-
. troller. 
This cause ~a~e _on this day to be heard upon the bill oi 
the· ~~mplain~nt ~nd upon proof· of legal service of proper-
process t1pon the defendants, th~ Commonwealth of Virginia, 
L. McCart4y Downs, ~uditor of Public Accounts of the Com-
monwe'alth of Virginia_, John M. Purcell, State Treasurer, 
~nd ~· R. Combs, Comptroller, 'Qpon the demurrer to the 
said bill of complaint filed by the Attorney General of Vir-
ginia on. pehalf of ~he Cowmonwealth of Virginia, John M-
Purcell, State Treasurer, and E. R. Combs, Comptroller, and 
upon the suggestion of ·counsel for the Virginia State Fire-
men's Association and State Fire Chiefs' Association of Vir-
g·inia, that because of th~ 1nterest of the membership of these 
associations in _the outcome of this proce~ding that they be 
permitte¢1 to ~ppear herein as amici curiae in support of the 
demurrer filed, to file briefs and to argue the question raised 
by the detp.urrer. ' · . 
UPON QONSIDERATIQN WHEREOF, the Court, with 
the consent of counsel for the complainant and of the Attor-
ney General of Virgi:iria, doth permit and invite the firm of 
Wallerstein, Goode_ & Evans, ·attorneys for Virginia State 
Firemen's Association and State Fir~ Chiefs' Association of 
Virginia to appear herein in support of the said 
page 22 ~ demurrer and to file briefs and to argue the ques-
. .. tion raised by the said demurrer. And thereupon 
counsel for the complainant and counsel for Virginia State 
Firemen's Association a.nd State- Fire Chiefs' Association 
of Vifginia appeared ~nd sub;mitted oral argument and filed 
briefs in support of their respective contentions; and the 
... , . l : !' \ ,. . ' ~· . : l . ; ' . ! 
~~-' i> -.1 :1 ~ · ... ~~P!~~~ Q~urt_ ~~ AP.P~~~~-. q% ::Yirg!n}~~ ·: ~.. . . . 
Couri qeing~o:( the opinioll th~t the.A-c't:.of the Generill .A,~~ 
sembly of Virginia, referred to in the said bill, approved 
March 31, 1932,. entitled: ·AN ACT to create a funq for th.e-
relief· of injured' and ~Clisabled firemen: !or the relief or the 
9.e}lendents- of deceased~·firemen ;. to provide for. the. appoihf-
inent o·f trustees to administer said fund; to levy a tax up'o·n· 
tlie premiums collected by ·an fire and lightning insurance·. 
companies doing business in this State, for ·the purpose~· 
aforesaid; to provide for· reports· pf such business;· to fix: 
penalties for the violation of the requ,ireme~ts imposed upon 
the said business; and for other purpo~~~ in conn~ction there-~ 
with, the same being Chapter 414 of the Acts of the.-Qeneral 
~ssembly of Virginia .for the ye-ar~·l932, ~-s ·uncons,titutional,.' 
. invalid ... and of n<? bind~:ng ~ e~e~t, .. do,th so -.decide, ·and dqth 
accordingly overrule the s~1d demurrer.~. , And the defendants 
name abo've having 'failed to 'plead, answer or ·aemqr.;tb ·tJ.le 
s·aid bill of complaint, and having indicated, upon the over-
i·nling. of·its demurrer, that· they did;. not ;desire to. :fil~ any 
plea of a·ns,yer. tq·. the saip. bill of complaint :filed' herein, th1e· 
safd·bill.of complaint is.taken for confessed, as·to.the ~llega~ 
#ons, of· fact contained th~rein. - , · · · -:. · '- · ... 
And jt' appea.ring to .the Court· that tlie complainant )lere:· 
. · in- was, _under the -supposed auth_ority, of ·the, said 
page ·23} ·act, ·assessed ·with the· sum of ·One Hundred and 
··- . · :-· · Eigllty'DQlliu;s and Seventy-:Eight ·cents ($180.78). 
based upon the ·.gross ·amount :of· premiuln.S:· collected and 
received by it ·from its fire and lightning in.surance"bnsine~s· 
done within the. limits of certain cities, towns, co.unties and: 
magisterial districts within the State of ·Virginia, ·at the. rate·. 
of· fifty cents out .. of and. from every hundred dollars· of" such' 
premiums collected or received by· it from the 21st day. of: 
June, 1932. to· the ·31st day of December, 1932, both inclusive 
and was required to deliver and pay to th~ Treasure~ 9f 
Virginia the said sum of $180.78 and that the said sum. of 
$180.78 was delivered· and paid· -by the said· co~pl~iilaD:t:·'tfl 
the Sl:lid .John ··M. Purcell, State Treasiirer.., on the 15th··da~ 
of April,.1933;· and7t further~ aPP,~aring totha Court that ·be~· 
cause or th~ ·.unco.nstitutiohality and- invalidity . .'of, the. ;saio 
Act of the .Gene.ral AsseJD.bly ·of 'Vi:t:ginia: the said s.uln ·.of.·, 
$180.7.8 ·w:as illeg~,tlly levied, assessed and -collected·;' th!lt if dieT 
~ot pass iuto the. State Treasury and thaF the same is .:TI.O'W: 
held by the Stat.e .Tre~surer· in -sepa_rate. accoui;i.t; that thb 
said sum of $180'~78 ·cannp~,'becaJI_se 'of·_the inval~dity ·9f··t:P,e 
said act, .be used fQr the· purpose set .o(l~ tJ;i~reil).; 'tha~ H1~· 
supposed Eeneficiaries of :the said 'fund--as proVided··inl tn'e 
~aid act, have ·no interest ·therein n_or rights· ther~to and tliat: 
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the said fund cannot under the terms of the said act be used 
for any other purposes than those referred to in the said act 
and that because of the invalidity of the said act the said 
fund cannot be used for such purposes and that 
page 24 ~ the same should, therefore, be returned to said 
· complainant; 
And the Court doth accordingly adjudge, order and decree 
that the said ·E. R. Combs, Comptroller, do issue to the com-
l>lainant herein or to his attorney of record in this suit 
his warrant for the said sum of $180.78 so paid by the said 
complainant to the State Treasurer and tha.t upon presenta-
tion of the said warrant, properly indorsed, the said John M. 
Purcell, State Treasurer do pay the same. 
And it appearing to the Court that L. McCarthy Downs, 
Auditor of Public Accounts of the State of ·virginia, is not 
a proper party to this suit, the same is dismissed as to him. 
And the Respondents thinking themselves aggrieved by this 
decree and desiring to present to the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia a petition for an appeal therefrom, the 
Court doth suspend the execution of this decree for a· period 
of 90 days from the date hereof. 
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